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 There has been a tremendous increase in the number and variety of 
ecosystems. Extant literature has paid more attention to platform owners within 
ecosystems. In this dissertation, I focus on complementors and try to understand their 
capabilities and strategies. First, I review the literature and summarize existing research 
that spans across the three phases of the ecosystem namely nascent, growth and 
technological change. I highlight some of the gaps in existing research, especially those 
concerning the nature and role of complementors within the ecosystem. I use empirical 
studies based on the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Platform Ecosystem to address 
some of these gaps. More specifically, in one study, I look at the complementor strategy of 
multihoming and explore the role played by complementor capabilities in terms of their 
human capital and ecosystem learning facilitated by the complementor’s prior platform 
partnership in multihoming. In another study, I examine the relationship between platform 
level competition and complementor performance. When an incumbent platform faces 
competition from an entrant platform, it tends to engage in steering activities that are aimed 
at supporting its complementors and dissuading them from joining the rival platform. I 
analyze the potential role of steering in complementor performance and its differential 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is aimed at learning about complementors and the role played by 
them in platform ecosystems.  There has been a tremendous increase in the number and 
variety of ICT enabled ecosystems over the last few decades that have together given rise 
to what we now relate to as the digital economy. On the one hand, while traditional strategy 
literature has offered vast insights into the origin and sustenance of firm competitive 
advantage, many of its theories have seldom been applied to ecosystems. On the other hand, 
though the ecosystem literature has been burgeoning over the last several years, it has 
brought with it its own set of concepts, methods, and terminologies. This has led to a 
fundamental question: Is the ecosystem a phenomenon or theory? There is a need for a 
reconciliation between these two seemingly disparate literatures. How can we enrich our 
understanding of ecosystems by bringing in theoretical insights from the broader strategy 
literature? What can the broader strategy literature learn from exploring ecosystems? My 
own dissertation is an attempt in this direction. 
In the first chapter, I review the extant literature on ecosystems. The purpose of this 
review is to explore the literature to better understand how different types of firms 
cooperate and compete to create and capture value in the ecosystem. Scholars in this field 
have focused on what may be thought of as three distinct phases that together constitute 
the lifecycle of the ecosystem namely nascent, growth and technological change. 
Accordingly, I employ this three-phase framework and focus on the major papers that 
pertain to each of the phases of the ecosystem. 
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The review enables us to identify some of the gaps in the literature, the filling of 
which could form potential avenues for future research. I summarize below the major 
learnings from the review and pertinent questions raised by it. First, ecosystem business 
models differ from traditional business models especially with regard to the complexity 
involved in value creation and appropriation in an environment characterized by 
fragmented yet overlapping property rights.  In such environments, firms need to learn how 
to balance cooperation and competition in order to achieve their strategic objectives. For 
example, cooperation among competing firms through standard setting organizations and 
industry consortia enhances the chances of technology adoption through follow on 
innovation. Participation in such groups provides individual firms an opportunity to have 
their say in the technology’s evolutionary trajectory and, in turn, enables those firms to 
competitive effectively in later stages.  
Second, the traditional technology lifecycle approach is useful but incomplete when 
technologies are systemic and embedded in ecosystems. This is especially true of platform 
ecosystems that involve complementary technologies. Transition from one technology 
generation to another is shaped by the challenge faced by the new technology in creating 
an ecosystem and opportunity available to the old technology to leverage on its existing 
ecosystem.  
Third, the literature has focused more on platform owners and has extended the 
same organization level analysis to analyzing them in the context of ecosystems. It looks 
at the ecosystem from a demand side perspective and focuses on the platform owner’s 
problem of balancing the two sides of the ecosystem namely complementors and customers 
in the presence of network effects. In order to develop a more complete understanding of 
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ecosystems, we may need to move beyond platform owners and focus on other players 
such as complementors that play a crucial role in the origin, growth, and sustenance of 
ecosystems. Some of the specific questions related to the role of complementors include 
the following. How do complementors help in resolving bottlenecks in nascent 
ecosystems? How do bottleneck shifts affect complementors? How do complementor 
capabilities affect their response to growth in the ecosystem? How do complementors 
affect the growth of the ecosystem? How do complementors impact and are impacted by 
technological change? How platform owner actions affect complementors? How 
complementor actions affect platform owners? 
In the next two chapter of my dissertation, I try to understand more about 
complementors and possibly answer some of these questions. I address two main gaps in 
the current literature highlighted by the review. First, existing literature is dominated by a 
demand side perspective on ecosystems and is less informative on the supply side. I take a 
supply side perspective and try to understand how complementor capabilities affect their 
ability to respond to changes in the ecosystem. In particular, I focus on human capital as a 
source of complementor capabilities and the evolution and reinforcement of those 
capabilities over time through ecosystem learning i.e. learning from the platform owner 
and customers. Second, I look at how platform level competition affects complementors. 
In particular, I look at how an increase in platform level competition benefits 
complementors and improves their performance. Further, I look at how the ability to 
internalize such benefits various across complementors based on their human capital. 
I use the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) platform ecosystem setting and focus 
on a period marked by industry consolidation and intense rivalry between the principal 
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platform owners SAP and Oracle to test my theoretical assertions. For this purpose, I built 
a novel dataset by combining data from a variety of sources including archived websites, 
press releases, 10K reports, National Establishment Times Series, and LinkedIn. In the 
second chapter, I focus on the phenomenon of multihoming, a complementor’s decision to 
affiliate with multiple platforms. Finding answers related to what causes multihoming and 
how it impacts the complementor can be especially tricky given that human capital 
investment by the complementor may be correlated with the benefits of affiliating with a 
different platform. To address this concern, I make use of a positive demand shock in the 
ERP platform ecosystem in the mid 2000’s, which was plausibly exogenous to the SAP 
complementors in my sample. An increase in demand on a rival platform (Oracle) should 
encourage complementors of the focal platform (SAP) to multihome into the rival platform 
(Oracle). However, I find that not all complementors are capable of multihoming. In 
particular, those complementors that are narrowly specialized in their pre-shock human 
capital lack the dynamic and integrative capabilities required to multihome. Further, longer 
duration of prior partnership (with SAP) enables better ecosystem learning that facilitates 
multihoming. However, such benefits reinforce the advantage of generalist complementors 
that have wider variety of human capital in multihoming and leave behind the specialists 
once again. 
In the third chapter, I look at how platform level competition for growth in installed 
base affects complementors. In the case of two-sided platform ecosystems, in the presence 
of cross-side network effects, the growth of a rival platform’s installed base on one side of 
the market is likely to hurt complementors of the focal platform on the other side of the 
market.  However, platform owners would be more willing to share value with 
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complementors when faced with competition from another platform to dissuade them from 
joining the rival platform. We do find empirical evidence consistent with the latter in the 
ERP platform ecosystem setting. When faced with competitive threat from a rival platform 
(Oracle) that intends to grow its installed base through acquisitions, the focal platform 
(SAP) engages in ‘steering’, activities aimed at promoting the complementor, supporting 
its development efforts, and, thus,  encouraging it to stay away from the rival platform. 
While steering improves the performance of all SAP complementors, on average, specialist 
complementors tend to be worse off than others. Further, we find that these results continue 




CHAPTER 2. VALUE CO-CREATION AND 
APPROPRIATION WITHIN ECOSYSTEMS  
2.1 Introduction 
Firms such as Apple, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft have become very successful 
in recent years largely due to their ability to create, build and manage their ecosystems.1 
Fast growing firms such as Uber, Airbnb and Spotify are now trying to emulate the model 
in diverse industries and are building ecosystems along with their partners to get there.2 
The literature is also catching up with the trend (refer to figure 2.1.) as researchers in the 
field of strategic management increasingly try to embrace the new business reality 
dominated by ecosystems. This, in turn, is beginning to get reflected in the kind of research 
questions asked and the methodologies adopted in answering them.3 
The field of strategic management has primarily been concerned with the origin 
and sustenance of firm competitive advantage and the consequent heterogeneity in firm 
performance. Over the years, performance heterogeneity has been attributed to the industry 
(Porter, 1980; McGahan and Porter, 1995) as well as firm level elements such as resources 
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and dynamic 
capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). But, more recently, the ecosystem has 
emerged as a pertinent level of analysis (Teece, 2007; Adner and Kapoor, 2010). The 
                                                 
1 Seven of the world’s top ten companies (by market capitalization) as of 2018 are ecosystem based 
companies. 
2 As per CB Insights, as much as 70% of start-ups valued at $1 billion or above (unicorns) are platform 
companies.  
3 One concern related to research on ecosystems has been the concomitant rise of terminologies that are 
often seen as unique to ecosystems, limiting the broader applicability of its findings. This aspect is 
discussed in more detail in a later section. 
 7 
ecosystem may be thought of as a loosely governed network4 that includes firms that 
occupy the core of the ecosystem, upstream suppliers that provide components that are 
combined into the product core and downstream complementors whose offerings are 
combined with the core by customers based on their needs.5 
 
Source: Google Scholar 
                                                 
4 Jacobides, Cennamo and Gawer (2018) distinguishes between ecosystem governance and alliance 
network governance 
5 In addition, standard setting organizations (SSOs), research universities/ laboratories and legal and 
regulatory authorities act as support institutions and influence the nature and growth of innovation within 























































































































Figure 2.1. Research on Ecosystems over Time 
Note: The number of publications in any given year is based on the number of search hits in Google Scholar 
that matches the particular variant of the term ecosystem.  In the research literature, the term business 
ecosystem is used in a very broad sense and may often involve a platform and witness rapid innovation or 
both. However, some researchers prefer to use the term platform ecosystem to imply that the entire ecosystem 
is built around one or more platforms at its core and still others choose innovation ecosystem to stress on the 
pivotal role played by innovation in fostering growth within such an ecosystem. In order to ensure 
comprehensiveness, the present review shall include papers that assume all three variants of the ecosystem 
definition. 
Table 2.1 Rise in Research on Ecosystems 
Period 






Since 1996 14527 13307 2166 
Since 2010 13301 10938 2004 
Note: Similar to figure 2.1, the number of publications in any given year is based on the number of search 
hits in Google Scholar that matches the particular variant of the term ecosystem. It may be seen that the 
number of publications that use these terms has grown tremendously in recent years. 
The purpose of this review is to explore the literature on ecosystems to better 
understand how different types of firms compete and cooperate to shape its business model 
across the different phases namely nascent, growth, and technological change that together 
constitute the lifecycle of an ecosystem. This shall also enable us to identify some of the 
gaps in the existing literature and potential avenues for future research. We briefly discuss 
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below what we mean by an ecosystem’s business model, how the traditional technology 
lifecycle approach is useful but incomplete when technologies are systemic and embedded 
in ecosystems, and why we need to move away from our focus on platform owners alone 
when it comes to studying ecosystems. 
A business model outlines the way in which value is created, captured and shared 
within any business ecosystem (Teece, 2010). Even though the concept in itself is not new, 
in recent years, the proliferation of the internet has led to a concomitant rise and spread of 
new business models (Zott, Amit and Massa, 2011) marked by the presence of one or few 
platform owners and numerous suppliers/complementors and value co-creation through a 
complex network of relationships among them (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999). Value 
creation and capture in these new digital ecosystems pose very different challenges 
compared to those faced in the industrial economy (Teece, 2018). 
S-curves have often been used to depict the inter-temporal dynamics of technology 
diffusion at the level of the industry (Foster 1986; Utterback, 1994). While this approach 
has been highly useful in understanding technology diffusion (Rogers, 2003; Hall, 2004) 
and technology change (Christensen, 1997), it has largely taken a technology first approach 
and ignored the role of the ecosystem in which it is embedded (Adner and Kapoor, 2016). 
In particular, on the one hand, complements could accelerate adoption of a new technology 
by generating network effects. For example, the availability of complements through the 
iTunes store enabled the adoption of the Apple iPod (Yoffie and Rossano, 2012). Similarly, 
the availability of battery switching stations could increase the adoption of electric vehicle 
technology (Avci, Girotra, and Netessine, 2014). On the other hand, the inability of 
complements to adapt to change could impede the technology’s adoption by slowing its 
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performance. For example, the inability of game developers to adapt could force console 
makers to stay behind the technology frontier (Claussen, Essling, and Kretschmer, 2015). 
Similarly, the hesitation of handset makers in moving away from the manufacturing of 
older generation of handsets with lower battery life disrupted mobile operations during the 
transition from 2G to 3G mobile services (Ansari and Garud, 2009).  
Prior work on ecosystems has mostly focused on the platform owner and its 
strategies (Iansiti and Levien 2004; Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2009) and the 
complementor has often been missing or relegated to a minor role. In essence, this has led 
to extension of the same organization level analysis to the new realm of ecosystems where 
the strategies of the central firm continues to dominate the analysis. However, more 
recently, researchers have begun to look at complementors’ strategies (Ceccagnoli et. al., 
2012) and the sustenance of their competitive advantage (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). It 
is important to research about complementors not only to know more about complementors 
themselves but to understand how they influence the creation and appropriation of value 
within the ecosystem across its different phases and the sustenance of the ecosystem’s 
business model. 
Recent reviews on ecosystems have laid emphasis on bridging and integrating 
divergent perspectives on ecosystems. Gawer (2014) explores the conceptualization of 
platforms either as two-sided markets or modular technology architectures.   McIntyre and 
Srinivasan (2017) talks about industrial organization economics, technology management 
and strategic management perspectives and the need for studies to integrate these different 
strands for research.  While acknowledging these divergent perspectives on ecosystems, 
the present review shall lay emphasis on how this relates to the evolution of ecosystems 
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across different phases starting with nascent and moving on to growth and technological 
change and what this means for value creation and appropriation by not just platform 
owners but complementors.  
The review shall begin with the ecosystem paradigm and identify its distinguishing 
features namely multi-sidedness, network effects and modularity. Next, it shall identify the 
players that together constitute the ecosystem. Following this, an ecosystem phase based 
framework would be proposed; the players that form part of the ecosystem (especially 
complementors) would be integrated into the framework; and the literature shall be 
reviewed to identify theoretical postulates and empirical results that fit with various 
elements of this framework. This shall be followed by a concluding section that 
summarizes the discussion in the previous sections and identifies the key takeaways for 
researchers from the review.  
2.2 The Ecosystem Paradigm 
Within the strategy literature, two models have dominated our thinking concerning 
the creation and sustenance of firm competitive advantage. The former is that of the firm 
which possesses valuable and rare resources (Barney, 1991) and has the unique capabilities 
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) to exploit these resources to its advantage. The latter is 
that of the industry (Porter, 1980) composed of various forces in the form of competitors, 
suppliers, buyers, substitutes, and (threat of) new entrants that together shape the firm’s 
value creation and appropriation opportunities. 
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2.2.1 Phenomena or Theory.  
But recently, a set of phenomena that has consistently played out across a wide 
range of industries and that has reshaped those industries in profound ways has been 
loosely understood as ecosystem strategy. Researchers have also been motivated to study 
such occurrences more closely because they now represent significant economic value 
within the broader economy.6 However, it is still unclear whether these phenomena simply 
represent temporalities within industries that fit a Schumpeterian world view or they have 
the potential to result in a paradigm shift in theories (Kuhn, 1962) concerning the firm as 
the locus of value creation and appropriation and the industry as a grouping of competing 
firms that influence the nature and extent of such value creation and capture. 
2.2.2 Distinguishing Features 
Three features of ecosystems have often been highlighted to ontologically delineate 
them from traditional industries.7 The first concerns multi-sidedness (Armstrong, 2006) 
that introduces the possibility that a firm could capture value by (potentially) charging 
multiple groups that occupy different parts of the value chain at the same time. For 
example, in a traditional automobile supply chain, a firm engaged in assembly pays its 
suppliers for raw materials or components, transforms these raw materials and combines 
these components into a final product for which it charges from end users. But, in the case 
of multi-sided markets such as credit cards, the firm can charge a fee from both sides 
                                                 
6 As per the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the digital economy largely comprised of 
ecosystems accounted for 6.9 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, or $1.35 trillion in 2017. 
7 Note that not all ecosystems share all three features though it is common to observe more than one feature 
operating within an ecosystem at the same time. 
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namely the merchants that accept card payments and end users that subscribe to those cards 
as a payment option.  
The second feature is that of network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), which may 
simply be understood as the benefits that accrue to an individual buyer from others 
purchasing/ subscribing to the same product/ service. While network effects have been 
prevalent in many industries such as telephone communication or cab services over a long 
period of time, the digital economy has brought them to the fore. A unique aspect of 
ecosystems that are also two-sided markets is the possibility of cross-side network effects 
i.e. the benefits that accrue to members on one side of the market from having more 
members on the other side of the market. This makes it possible for intermediaries that 
govern the two sided market to subsidize one side at the expense of the other side, resulting 
even in free goods/ services in some cases (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005). 
The third feature is modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Modularity is an 
approach toward designing a complex system in a manner that allows for high degree of 
technical interdependence within a component but limited technical interdependence 
across components. It allows for the possibility to design and deploy components with 
limited knowledge concerning the technical complexity of other components that may 
potentially interact with the focal component. A simple example in software programming 
is an application programmable interface (API) that allows the developer to combine 
multiple software components say a map for navigation and a social network to connect 
with friends to create a custom app that enables one to track or share real time location 
information. In this example, the modular nature of the components and the readily 
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accessible APIs to connect them relieves the developer that aims to make such a connection 
from the knowledge concerning the complex code built into the map or the social network. 
It is important to pay attention to these features to not only understand the nuances 
of value creation and appropriation within ecosystems but to set boundaries on theories 
concerning ecosystems. While some would argue that these features are embedded more 
or less in every major industry that we are interested in as scholars, two aspects concerning 
the observed prevalence of these features help us with both sense making and limiting the 
scope of our theory. First, these features seem to be more pronounced in some industries 
rather than others in determining both opportunities and risks associated with value 
creation and value capture. Second, these features tend to be, more often than not, 
associated with technologically intensive markets rather than others.  
2.2.3 Players within the ecosystem 
2.2.3.1 Platform owner.  
The platform owner occupies a prominent position within the business network that 
makes up the ecosystem and often times owns the core platform or governs the critical 
value chain around which the ecosystem is built. Within the literature, depending on the 
context, platform owners have been referred to as platform leaders (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2002), keystone firms (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) or platform owners (Gawer and 
Henderson, 2007; Ceccagnoli et. al., 2012). Most ecosystems comprise of just one or a few 
owners. Examples include Apple and Google in the mobile application ecosystem, SAP 
and Oracle in the ERP ecosystem, Uber and Lyft in the online based urban mobility 
ecosystem and so on. Platform owners play an important role in shaping the future of their 
 15 
ecosystem through several strategic decisions such as choosing between open and closed 
innovation (Chesborough, 2003); determining the level of modularity of the core product 
or service (Baldwin and Clark, 2000); and cooperating with other owners in standard 
setting (Shapiro, 2000; Farrell et. al., 2007; Simcoe, 2012; Axelrod et. al; 1995). 
 
Figure 2.2 Players in the Ecosystem  
2.2.3.2 Complementors or Suppliers.  
While the terms suppliers and complementors sometimes tend to be used 
interchangeably, it is important to draw a distinction between the two to better understand 
the location of value creation and appropriation. In the context of an ecosystem, suppliers 
may simply be understood as firms that make the components that go into the core product 
that is bundled together by the platform owner. In the automobile industry, for example, 
Others (SSOs, 
Industry Consortia, 







supplier parks are redefining firm boundaries and a huge chunk of the production is now 
carried out by suppliers in the ecosystem instead of the core companies (Sako, 2009). On 
the other hand, complementors may be thought of as firms that create products that add 
value to the core product (Brandenburger, and Nalebuff, 1996) and that are often bundled 
along with the core product by customers. For example, there are more than a million apps 
on Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android platforms today. While a handful of apps are built 
by Apple and Google themselves, a vast majority of them are actually built by 
complementors. Customers may choose to download certain applications and bundle them 
with the core product, which is the smartphone in this case, to derive value from the 
ecosystem. Even though value addition by the marginal complementor or supplier, in 
isolation, may not be significant, the combined effect of a huge number of complementors 
or suppliers can be tremendous. The willingness of complementors or suppliers to partner 
with platform owners and invest in relational capital not only affects knowledge transfer 
and individual complementor profitability but influences the overall growth of innovation 
and helps in achieving scale within the ecosystem. 
2.2.3.3 Other Players.  
Apart from platform owners, complementors and suppliers that play an important 
role in ecosystems, we can think of grouping of players in industrial consortia and standard 
setting organizations, support institutions such as research universities and laboratories, 
and customers as an integral part of the ecosystem.  This review shall not focus directly on 
the incentives of these players but shall nevertheless include the players in the discussion 
to the extent that they relate to shaping the value creation and appropriation opportunities 
across the three ecosystem phases. 
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2.3 Phases of an Ecosystem – A Review 
Three major sequential phases of the ecosystem namely nascent, growth and 
technological change have been of interest to researchers. To understand what we mean by 
these three phases, let us consider the wireless telecommunication ecosystem. The nascent 
phase of this ecosystem involves the creation of the enabling technologies, resolution of 
technical and other issues that impede coordination among these technologies, cooperation 
and competition among players in the ecosystem to influence the emergence of standards 
that govern the interoperability and use of these technologies. The growth phase entails the 
adoption of wireless telecommunication by end users on the one side and the supply of 
hardware, software, and applications by suppliers and complementors on the other. 
Technological change phase refers to a period during which wireless telecommunication 
moves from one generation to another. This could adversely affect the existing patterns of 
value creation and capture and the sustenance of competitive advantage of existing players 
in the ecosystem, a possibility that we shall discuss in detail later. Following a major 
technology change, the ecosystem once again undergoes a nascent phase corresponding to 
the new technology generation followed by growth, resulting in a new ecosystem cycle.  
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Figure 2.3 Phases of an Ecosystem 
 Focus on a specific phase of the ecosystem has allowed researchers to better 
understand the unique challenges confronted by firms in that phase and explore the 
potential opportunities available to them to resolve some of those challenges. A review of 
the papers that pertain to each of these phases can help us take stock of some of the well-
established facts as well as track newly emerging trends within each of the phases. Hence, 
in this section, we shall look at each of these phases in detail. 
2.3.1 Nascent Phase 
We have considerable understanding of how individual firms behave in the very 
early stages that start right from founding based on the entrepreneurship literature (Zoltan 
and Audretsch, 2006). While the scope of the entrepreneurship literature is much broader, 
it has stressed more on new modes of value creation through innovation that can potentially 
disrupt existing industries but offers a limited perspective on value appropriation. In high 
technology industries, value appropriation not only depends on the potential ability to 
create value through a core technology asset but the presence of co-specialized 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986). To this, Teece (2006) adds complementary 
technologies that could influence value appropriation. Hence, the question of how firms 
Nascent Growth Technological Change
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relate to their ecosystems in the presence of various complementarities becomes important 
(Teece, 2018). 
The ecosystem context has its own challenges that makes it unique in some 
respects. This also makes it important for us to pay attention to the nascent phase in the 
context of the ecosystem. First, ecosystems shift the locus of value creation outside the 
organization (Parker, Van Alstyne, and Jiang, 2017) which necessitates participants in the 
ecosystem to ensure that interdependent components that are complementary are brought 
together to offer a coherent final product or service. Second, and related, ecosystems are 
required to overcome bottlenecks that hamper the overall performance of the ecosystem 
(Eisenhardt and Hannah, 2018). Third, there is a tension between the opportunity to create 
additional value by opening up the ecosystem to others and the ability to capture value that 
gets created in the ecosystem (Chesborough, 2003). We shall elaborate on each of these 
aspects in the following paragraphs. 
The first aspect concerns interdependencies among multiple entities in the 
ecosystem. One major problem faced by firms engaged in the development of system 
technologies laden with interdependencies is the potential fragmentation and overlap of 
intellectual property that could derail follow on innovation as well as adversely affect the 
sustenance of competitive advantage of firms that are part of the ecosystem (Rysman and 
Simcoe, 2008). Hence, a strand of the literature on the early stage of innovation has focused 
on standard setting organizations (SSOs) to understand how firms balance competition and 
cooperation within nascent ecosystems.  
 20 
Participation in industry consortia and standard setting exercises not only enhances 
an individual firm’s ability to have a say in the evolutionary trajectory of a new technology 
but also the arrival of a standard enhances the chances of adoption through follow on 
innovation (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Leiponen, 2008). Hence, it becomes important for 
policy makers to ensure the ready accessibility of institutions such as SSOs and other 
industrial consortia to large incumbents as well as small and resource constrained players.  
While effective institutions and standard setting enhance the cumulative impact of 
individual innovations (Furman and Stern, 2011), it may be noted that vendors could 
manage to create high switching costs even in the presence of open standards by 
manipulating compatibility (Chen and Forman, 2006). We discuss more about the 
implications of (lack of) compatibility in a subsequent section that focuses on technology. 
Nascent ecosystems are often confronted with bottlenecks that could hamper the 
widespread adoption of the product/ service. The firm that successfully resolves the 
bottleneck gets to appropriate value from the ecosystem. Bottlenecks are closely related to 
value creation and capture within an ecosystem. While resolution of bottlenecks leads to 
value creation and enables adoption of the overall technology system, the control of 
bottlenecks is important to ensure value capture. This often creates a tension in nascent 
ecosystems especially when there is technological complementarity within the ecosystem. 
On the one hand, the ability of the innovator to appropriate value can be challenged if the 
complement created by a different player in the ecosystem ends up becoming a bottleneck 
asset. On the other, the innovator may lack the capabilities to create the complement by 
themselves. 
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Bottlenecks may be understood as narrow points within a complex system that 
obstruct efficient flow within the system. Bottlenecks may be broadly classified as 
technical and strategic (Baldwin, 2015). Technical bottleneck may be thought of as an 
impediment that arises from physical properties of the system that limits its overall 
performance. For example, in the case of the electric vehicle ecosystem, the charging 
capacity of the batteries may be seen as a bottleneck that stems the performance of the 
electric vehicle, affecting the growth of the overall ecosystem. On the other hand, a 
strategic bottleneck is an ‘artificial’ bottleneck introduced by a firm that first creates values 
by solving the technical bottleneck and then captures value by controlling access over the 
solution. 
“What Apple has done since the launch of the iPhone is tell all iPhone owners and iPhone 
app developers that if they want to buy and sell apps, they have to go through the App 
Store,” ... “So Apple has set up this app store as a bottleneck where everyone in the iPhone 
ecosystem must transact.”8 
In the above example, the core product (the iPhone) composed of the OS and 
underlying hardware has a limited set of standard functionalities, which forms a technical 
bottleneck. One way to address this issue is to allow for the building of applications that 
enhance the core functionalities and enable users to perform a wide range of meaningful 
tasks. This value creation could potentially happen within the firm or through a community 
of developers and given the vast array of applications it makes more sense to open this to 
complementors. However, Apple’s decision to allow sales of these applications only 
                                                 
8 These quotes from Vaheesan, Legal Director at the Open Markets Institute, in Liptak and Nicas (2019) 
illustrate the use of strategic bottlenecks as an effective means to appropriate  value from the ecosystem 
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through its app store represents a strategic bottleneck that enables the effective capture of 
value. 
  This is further complicated by the possibility that bottlenecks could change over 
time (Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018). The paper shows that in the case of the solar 
ecosystem, finance was the initial bottleneck, owing to the high cost of solar panels. Over 
time, the cost of solar panels kept coming down and reached below $2/ watt by 2009. 
However, the costs incurred in acquiring a customer still remained quite high (~$2000 per 
customer). This shifted the bottleneck from finance to sales. Once, residential solar became 
more popular, customers generally became more aware of the value of the technology and 
this brought down the spending on sales. However, installation costs still remained quite 
high and now formed more than half of the total costs. Hence, by 2013, the bottleneck 
again shifted from sales to installation. As seen above, bottlenecks can shift continuously 
within nascent ecosystems and within relatively short periods of time. This requires firms 
to think more carefully about their competitive as well as cooperative strategies in order to 
be able to sustain their advantage in the ecosystem. 
The limited literature on nascent ecosystems offers little guidance to 
complementors on the strategies that they ought to pursue within the ecosystem. First, it is 
not clear whether complementors can successfully align with platform owners and create 
value by resolving bottlenecks. On the one side, complementary technologies are required 
for the successful adoption of nascent ecosystem. On the other, complementors could 
appropriate most of the value created by occupying the bottleneck. Such tensions could not 
only result in failure of the complementor but threaten the survival of the overall 
ecosystem. The unsuccessful attempt by a company called Better Place to complement the 
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EV ecosystem is a case in point. Through the provision of battery swapping services, the 
company successfully managed to resolve the twin bottlenecks that hampered the adoption 
of electric vehicles – the low range of the vehicle coupled with a high amount of time 
required for recharging. However, after raising close to a billion dollars, the company 
ended up as a failure. Users who had bought the car by counting on the complementary 
services of battery swapping were adversely affected by this, putting an end to the 
ecosystem, as originally conceptualized. The above case also illustrates how the resolution 
of a technical bottleneck is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for value capture 
(Baldwin, 2015). 
Second, we do not know much about the relationship between timing of entry of 
complementors into the ecosystem and consequent performance. While there is a rich 
literature on first-mover advantages (and disadvantages) it is not clear how it applies to 
complementors faced with the prospect of partnering within nascent ecosystems. Apart 
from the risk that a nascent ecosystem may not take off and become mainstream, there is 
the risk that a particular technology may not become the standard and/ or widely adopted. 
Complementors need to make their choices regarding entry in the face of these dual risks. 
To illustrate, the electric vehicle ecosystem in itself may fail to become mainstream owing 
to resurgence of the older fossil fuel powered ecosystem or the emergence of still another 
ecosystem powered by Hydrogen, for example. To add to this risk, either the charging 
standard or the battery swapping standard adopted initially may fail to emerge as the 
dominant design adopted by the ecosystem. Hence, we need to understand the risks and 
entry choices of complementors more thoroughly. 
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Third, we do not know much about the co-evolution of capabilities of platform 
owners and complementors within nascent ecosystems over time. For example, how do 
bottleneck shifts affect complementor capabilities? Certain bottlenecks shifts could help 
reinforce the existing capabilities of complementors while other shifts could render them 
obsolete. It is important to understand more clearly the nuances of such changes in different 
settings and across time. 
2.3.2 Growth Phase 
As per the industrial organization literature, value appropriation is tied to early 
entry advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1986), reinforcing of these advantages by 
setting up facilities for mass production (Christensen and Greene, 1976), marketing, and 
service and by making constant improvements by going down the learning curve (Spence, 
1981). While the literature has stressed on the role played by supply side economies of 
scale in the growth of firms in traditional industries, the narrative on newer industries built 
on a digital backbone such as e-commerce, social media, entertainment, and urban mobility 
has been dominated by a demand side perspective that lays emphasis on network effects 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1985) and customer switching costs (Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). This 
change in thinking has also influenced how we value firms based on their growth potential. 
One striking example that illustrates this change is the valuation premium enjoyed by Uber 
over many traditional automobile companies. Even though Uber does not own a single 
factory or count employees on its rolls, factors that are associated with supply side scale 
economies, it is seen as a company that can transform mobility through aggregation of 
demand for such services at an unprecedented scale.  
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The literature on network effects has been built on theoretical models (Katz and 
Shapiro 1985; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006) that have highlighted the 
tradeoffs faced by platform owners in balancing the two sides of the market namely 
complementors/ suppliers and customers. Empirical work has demonstrated the existence 
of network effects and measured the size of such effects in settings such as video games 
(Shankar and Bayus, 2003; Clements and Ohashi, 2005) and mobile telecommunications 
(Fuentelsaz, Maicas and Polo, 2012). An important implication from this literature is that 
the prevalence of network effects along with switching costs in an industry has the potential 
to tip the entire industry toward one or few players, a trend that could be very hard to 
reverse. For example, one of the reasons attributed to Blackberry’s failure is its inability to 
effectively manage its ecosystem (Jacobides, 2013). In spite of its superior core product 
offerings, it failed to attract application developers on one side by opening up the 
ecosystem and expand beyond its niche of business users on the other by appealing to the 
mass market.  
While the demand side view on ecosystems has enabled us to explain, to some 
extent, the tremendous growth of certain industries within a relatively short time period, 
more recently, researchers have begun to question some of the assumptions made in the 
theory. For example, Cennamo and Santalo (2013) demonstrate that winner-takes-all 
(WTA) strategies may not always be effective in improving platform owner’s performance. 
Rietveld and Eggers (2018) find that cross-side network effects may not apply uniformly. 
They show that heterogeneity in demand in terms of early and late adopters of the core 
platform could affect the sales of complementors on the other side of the ecosystem.  
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Researchers have also called into question the undue emphasis on quantity alone 
that network effects is based on. Afuah (2013) cautions against the undue emphasis on 
network size alone and stresses the role of network structure and conduct. According to the 
paper, structural elements such as members’ centrality, structural holes, network ties, 
possibility of transactions and the number of roles each member plays; and conduct such 
as opportunism, signaling, and perceptions of trust could play an important role in 
determining ecosystem outcomes. Others have stressed that the quality and variety of 
applications might be equally if not more important in determining platform level 
competitive outcomes. For example, Boudreau (2012) finds that increase in the producers 
of software applications increases the variety of applications produced on the platform. 
However, later cohorts seem to generate lesser quality applications and, also, there is 
crowding among similar applications. Still others have shown analytically the 
counterintuitive possibility that platform owners could actually create value by limiting the 
choice of applications on their platform (Casadesus-Masanell and Halaburda, 2014). 
While the emphasis of the literature on ecosystem has often been on prescriptions 
to platform owners to grow their ecosystem, there has been less research on what it entails 
for the growth of complementors. For example, complementors may often be unpaid and 
yet driven by several motivations other than sales such as signaling about reputation, 
hobbies etc. These could in turn affect how they respond to platform growth (Boudreau 
and Jeppesen, 2015). Also, less is known about the supply side such as in terms of the 
capabilities of the complementors to exploit demand side changes in the growth phase of 
the ecosystem (Venkataraman, Ceccagnoli and Forman, 2018).  
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Unlike the strategy literature that lays emphasis on resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991), knowledge (Grant, 1996), and dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen, 1997) of firms, the ecosystem literature has thus far relied more on output measures 
concerning complementors such as quantity, quality and pricing and offers very little 
insight on the capabilities of complementors, the nature of the knowledge production 
process within and across complementors, and, finally, how it relates to the growth of the 
broader ecosystem. 
In an environment in which firms increasingly rely on external application 
developers to grow their ecosystem (Parker, Van Alstyne, and Jiang, 2017), it becomes 
important to understand the sources of complementor knowledge and capabilities. Further, 
to develop a better understanding of ecosystem growth, there is a need to combine supply 
side and demand side perspectives and look at how complementors’ dynamic capabilities 
and integrative capabilities (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018) affect their response to demand 
side changes. 
More recently, researchers have pointed out some of the limitations in the existing 
literature and have brought focus to complementor capabilities and sustenance of 
complementor competitive advantage. A fundamental question faced by potential 
complementors concerns whether they should partner and join an ecosystem. Ceccagnoli 
et. al. (2012) finds that firms with a greater stock of intellectual property and those with 
stronger downstream capabilities are more likely to join a platform. This suggests that 
complementors see the threat of appropriation by the platform owner as a major concern 
with regard to their partnership decision. 
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Another complementor strategy that has attracted attention of scholars is that of 
multihoming, a phenomenon wherein a complementor decides to partner with more than 
one platform (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; Cennamo, Ozalp, and Kretschmer, 2018; 
Venkataraman, Ceccagnoli and Forman, 2018). Complementors may decide to partner with 
multiple platforms for a variety of reasons. First, it could be that the benefit from being 
able to expand into a related platform and serve a larger network of end users outweighs 
the costs. Second, a decision to partner with multiple platforms may actually stem from a 
threat from the platform owner with whom the complementor has an ongoing relationship. 
Third, in the face of technological change9, there is a possibility that complementors that 
are stuck with a single platform may be rendered obsolete. An interesting aspect concerning 
multihoming is that it not only affects the marginal complementor but a joint decision by 
several complementors to multihome has the potential to stem the tendency of the overall 
market to tip toward a single platform, as we discussed above. 
Ecosystem growth considerations could favorably or adversely affect platform 
owner-complementor relationships. On the one hand, platform owners may choose not to 
enter complementor markets to encourage growth and use commitment mechanisms based 
on a combination of organizational structure and processes to signal their intent to 
complementors who may be wary of joining them (Gawer and Henderson, 2007). On the 
other hand, as ecosystems mature and growth slows, platform owners may be tempted to 
enter and ‘envelop’ related markets (Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2011). Platform 
                                                 
9 Refer to the next section for a more detailed discussion on technological change as a phase of the 
ecosystem. 
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envelopers grow their market by foreclosing the incumbent's access to users. Envelopments 
could involve incumbent-entrant pairs that are complements, substitutes or unrelated.  
2.3.3 Technological Change 
The origin of technology change, in itself, can be quite complex, and has been 
attributed to a combination of advancements in science, economic factors, institutional 
changes, and resolution of unsolved problems that block technology paths (Dosi, 1982). 
Here, we are particularly interested in the potential of technology change to alter the nature 
of value creation and appropriation and challenge the sustenance of competitive advantage 
of incumbents.  
First, and perhaps the most obvious, the extent of the change affects firm 
adaptation. While incremental or continuous changes favor incumbents, radical or 
discontinuous changes favor entrants and enable them to dislodge incumbents (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986). Second, and more subtle, the nature of the change as it relates to 
component level changes or the manner in which components are recombined, referred to 
as architectural, can affect the incumbent’s ability to adjust to the change (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). The above two scenarios assume that the new technology is invariably 
superior in performance to the old technology that it replaces. Third, there could be 
instances in which the nature of demand across customer segments affects change, leading 
to a new technology that is initially inferior in performance disrupting the old technology 
(Christensen, 1997). The literature has relied more on technology push and demand pull 
based explanations but it has offered a limited perspective on how it is affected by the 
ecosystem in which it is embedded. 
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According to Adner and Kapoor (2016), transition from one technology generation 
to another is shaped by the challenge faced by the new technology in creating an ecosystem 
and opportunity available to the old technology to leverage on its existing ecosystem. For 
example, in the case of gasoline powered automobiles, component improvements such as 
more efficient internal combustion engines combined with complementor improvements 
such as cleaner fuels have enabled them to prolong the ecosystem.  At the same time, 
electric vehicles have challenges related to improving the quality of components especially 
given their limited experience,10 and ensuring the availability of complements in the form 
of charging stations.  
As illustrated above, both the emergence challenge faced by the new ecosystem and 
the extension opportunity available to the existing ecosystem enable incumbents to sustain 
their competitive advantage. However, there could also be instances in which the 
ecosystem constraints the ability of the incumbent to adapt. For example, Afuah (2000) 
argues that the existing capabilities of suppliers and complementors may be rendered 
obsolete in the phase of technological change and this could in turn affect the performance 
of the focal firm. 
Similar to differences in customer expectations (Christensen, 1997), differences in 
complementor capabilities could introduce competing pressures on the platform owner in 
an ecosystem. As illustrated in the case of Intel (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002), some 
complementors would like the platform owner to move faster to the next technology 
generation. Other complementors might want the platform owner to continue with the old 
                                                 
10 The Wall Street Journal article titled Quality Woes a Challenge for Tesla’s High-Volume Car talks about 
Tesla’s struggles with production 
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technology generation. These pressures are further complicated by platform level 
competition. To be able to compete effective with competitors, platform owners may like 
to set their technology level closest to the frontier (Claussen, Essling, and Kretschmer, 
2015). However, pressure from certain segments of complementors might push them to 
settle for a lower level. 
An aspect of technological change that is especially relevant to ecosystems is the 
level of compatibility across different platforms and across generations of the same 
platform. Platform owners could increase or decrease the level of compatibility of their 
platform with regard to other platforms or older generations of the same platform to 
encourage or discourage porting of applications on the one side and switching of users on 
the other.  
Adner, Chen and Zhu (2016) focuses on compatibility with other platforms. The 
paper uses the case of Apple iPad and Amazon Kindle to illustrate how an entrant or 
incumbent may use technology compatibility as a lever in orchestrating the ecosystem. The 
paper also highlights the tradeoff faced by entrants in such ecosystems. On the one hand, 
entrants need to try and differentiate their core product from others to appeal to customers, 
which could make the product less compatible with others. On the other, they need to 
ensure the availability of complements that work well with the product, which forces them 
to make their product more compatible. 
Compatibility with other platforms could also have an impact on complementor 
strategies. While complementors have several incentives to multihome (as discussed 
earlier), they also face tradeoffs while designing their products for multiple platforms that 
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often differ in their architectures (Cennamo, Ozalp, and Kretschmer, 2018). This in turn 
leads to a situation where multihoming complements have lower-quality in a more complex 
platform. However, complements that are introduced on the more complex platform with 
a delay suffer a smaller drop in quality.  
Kapoor and Agarwal (2017) and Kretschmer and Claussen (2016), on the other 
hand, focus on generational transitions and how it affects complementors. Kapoor and 
Agarwal (2017) uses the mobile ecosystem setting to show that complementors are 
adversely affected every time there is a generational transition. This could be due to the 
failure to quickly adapt to the changes that come with every transition. Although companies 
try their best to ensure backward compatibility (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017: P. 535), it still 
becomes difficult to ensure that app developers on the one side and users on the other are 
on the same stable version. 
Kretschmer and Claussen (2016) studies the US market on video consoles and 
explores the dual role played by backward compatibility in generational transitions. On the 
one side, backward compatibility plays a positive role by enabling the ready availability of 
complements without having to rebuild them. On the other, backward compatibility has a 
negative effect on the entry of new complements. Thus, compatibility has important 
implication not only for individual complementors but for overall ecosystem innovation 
and growth. 
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
The ecosystem as a concept is still evolving. Based on what we have seen, we know 
more about platform owners and their strategies while we have less insights on 
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complementors and their strategies. Unlike the strategy literature that has stressed on the 
supply side factors such as resources and capabilities, the literature on ecosystems is 
dominated by a demand side perspective. To address these concerns, future research needs 
to focus more on complementors and how they relate to the ecosystem. Following are a 
few examples of unanswered questions. What is the source of complementor capabilities? 
Why and when do complementors engage in strategies such as multihoming? How do 
complementor strategies relate to their own performance? How do complementor strategies 
affect platform performance and tipping of the ecosystem? 
There has been considerable growth in research on each of the different phases of the 
ecosystem. However, there has been less research that synthesizes the product lifecycle 
approach and the locus of value creation and value appropriation in the ecosystem. 
Clements and Ohashi (2005) is perhaps a notable exception. According to the paper, in the 
video game ecosystem, a focus on hardware pricing is an effective strategy in the 
introductory stage while software variety becomes more important later on in the lifecycle. 
They also show that there is an inertia with respect to sales in the software market that is 
not observed in the hardware market. In other words, software providers continue to exploit 
the installed base of existing hardware users even when the demand for new hardware has 
slowed. We need more such research that cuts across ecosystem phases. How does early 
imprinting in nascent ecosystems affect the ecosystem’s growth trajectory? How does 
technological change affect growth in the number of complements and the quality of 
complements?  
The growth of the ecosystem literature has also been accompanied by a set of 
terminologies such as two-sidedness, network effects, modularity, tipping, multihoming, 
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steering, envelopment etc. While this has enhanced our ability to understand the workings 
of ecosystems, on the one hand, it has also made it difficult to compare ecosystem strategies 
with other traditional strategies such as alliances and networks, vertical and horizontal 
integration, economies of scale and scope etc. Also, research on ecosystems often uses 
outcomes measures such as application rankings, number of installations, and user ratings. 
It is not clear how these relate to traditional measures of performance such as sales and 
profits. We feel that the next phase of research should be aimed at integration of the 
ecosystem literature with the broader strategy literature with an aim to harmonize theories, 
terminologies, and measures, where possible. How can we enrich our understanding of 
ecosystems by bringing in theoretical insights from the broader strategy literature? What 
can the broader strategy literature learn from ecosystems? This is essential to not only build 
a more complete theory of ecosystems (Jacobides, Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018) but, in 
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CHAPTER 3. MULTIHOMING WITHIN PLATFORM 




Across industries such as gaming, mobile, business software, e-commerce and credit 
cards, the nature of competition has shifted from product-based to platform-based 
competition (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2016; Choudary, 
Van Alstyne, and Parker, 2016). A platform ecosystem may be thought of as taking a “hub 
and spoke” form composed of a central product that is connected to complementors that 
contribute toward building around it through their product or service offerings (Jacobides, 
Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Gawer, 2014).11 
Within this context, a key strategic decision for many potential complementors is 
whether to affiliate with a particular platform. A related question is whether complementors 
should affiliate with multiple platforms, or multihome. These decision have important 
implications for the performance of many software firms (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Kapoor 
and Agarwal, 2017) and the quality of their products (Cennamo, Ozalp, and Kretschmer, 
2018; Claussen, Kretschmer, and Mayrhofer, 2013). An evolving literature has explored 
how platform owners can influence the value to potential complementors of affiliating with 
the platform by shaping the costs of coordinating with the platform and ecosystem 
                                                 
11 In this way, our definition of platforms shares more with the “engineering view” of platforms as 
described by Gawer (2014), which emphasizes that platforms are technological architectures that 
facilitate innovation. This is in contrast to the “economics perspective” which sees platforms as a vehicle 
for market exchange. 
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(Boudreau, 2010; Gawer, 2014; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Tiwana, 2015).12 However, 
so far there has been relatively little exploration of how the strategic actions taken by 
potential complementors can shape their benefits of affiliating with a platform (Ceccagnoli 
et al., 2012; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). In particular there is relatively little 
understanding of how complementor actions can shape the coordination costs—and in turn 
overall benefits—of affiliating with a platform.13 This is an important gap in knowledge, 
as understanding the interrelationships between platform affiliation and other decisions 
will have important performance implications for many software firms.  
We study the decisions of software firms to multihome across enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) ecosystems. Our core research question asks whether and how ex ante 
differences in a complementor’s human capital influences the decision to multihome, and 
how the impact of these differences are shaped by learning that takes place during the 
relationship with the existing platform. To answer this question, we take as our starting 
point that a firm’s human capital will affect its ability to pursue its strategies (Castanias 
and Helfat, 1991, 2001; Mayer, Somaya, and Williamson, 2012). ERP involves the 
automation of a firm’s business processes through software. As a result, unlike software 
written for consumers, producing for an ERP platform requires knowledge and skills not 
only related to technology such as programming languages. In particular, it also requires 
knowledge and skills related to the functional business processes defined in the software 
as well as the industry of customers in which the software is used. Further, the diversity of 
                                                 
12 The cited papers represent examples of recent empirical testing of theoretical work that has explored 
themes related to modularity, openness, complexity, and control in a much longer stream of theory work. 
For some examples, see Anderson et al. (2013), Baldwin and Clark (2000), Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), 
Parker and Van Alstyne (2018), Parker, Van Alstyne, and Jiang (2018), and Tiwana et al (2010).  
13 Notable exceptions include Kapoor and Agarwal (2017), Cennamo, Ozlap, and Kretschmer (2018), and 
Agarwal and Kapoor (2018). We discuss our relation to these papers in further detail below.  
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knowledge and overlapping knowledge boundaries induce cospecialization among diverse 
forms of human capital and raise the costs of acquiring these skills on the external market 
(Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Carlile, 2002; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). 
In short, we hypothesize that firms who are generalists—i.e., those possessing multiple 
types of cospecialized human capital—will be more likely to multihome.  
Our focus on knowledge and learning allows us to examine another important 
question for complementors: how learning that occurs as a result of affiliating with the 
existing (home-) platform influences the probability of multihoming. As the result of 
repeated interactions with the platform owner and the existing ecosystem, complementors 
learn how to more effectively produce for the platform and meet the needs of platform 
customers. Some kinds of learning are more transferable to the new platform, such as 
organizational knowledge and competences that facilitate spanning boundaries across the 
ecosystem. We therefore hypothesize that over time that complementors will be more likely 
to multihome. However, as the platform partnership evolves, the key mechanism that 
provides an advantage to generalists to begin with will become more important over time.  
That is, knowledge accumulation at the intersection of diverse forms of human capital as 
well as the development of organizational competences in integrating knowledge across 
boundaries provide an additional source of learning for generalists that increase their 
propensity to multihome relative to specialists as the existing partnership evolves.  
We test our ideas using a unique event that occurred within the enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) platform ecosystem: a shock to the size of the installed base of one platform 
vendor, Oracle, triggered by a short period of intense platform-level acquisitions.14 We 
                                                 
14 Starting in the year 2004, Oracle initiated a series of acquisitions starting with that of PeopleSoft for 
more than $10 billion, which was then the largest ever acquisition across technology-based industries.  
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study the decisions of small SAP complementors as a response to this shock,15 allowing us 
to examine how ex ante differences in human capital and learning with the existing 
platform lead to heterogeneity in response to this event. We take advantage of employee-
level data from LinkedIn to create a unique measure of human capital specialization. Our 
analysis uses an unbalanced panel composed of 226 firms corresponding to 1020 
observations spread across the years 2001-2006.  
Our empirical findings inform the relationship between human capital 
specialization, duration of relationship with the existing platform, and the decision to 
multihome. Consistent with our theory, we find that firms specialized in one form of human 
capital are less likely to multihome after the demand shock. Similarly, we demonstrate that 
the usefulness of a given form of human capital to multihoming increases with the addition 
of any other form of human capital involved in the software development process, 
providing empirical support for cospecialization among diverse forms of human capital in 
integrating complementary software solutions with a platform.  
We further find that the longer the duration of prior partnership, the more likely a 
complementor will multihome. However, this relationship is stronger for generalists. We 
explore the robustness of these relationships to a variety of alternative specifications and 
measurement strategies. In particular, while it is challenging to disentangle the effect of 
internal firm learning and sources of learning associated with complementor activities 
within the existing ecosystem, we show that this relationship is robust to the inclusion of a 
proxy for internal firm learning. 
                                                 
15 To ensure homogeneity within the sample, we restrict our sample to relatively small firms with less than 
5000 employees when they enter the sample.  
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We leverage existing strategy research, mostly originating from the knowledge-
based view of the firm (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996), to contribute to recent 
research within the platform ecosystem literature that has explored how knowledge barriers 
and coordination costs influence the benefits and costs of affiliating with a platform. Most 
research on this topic has explored topics around how choices of the platform owner shape 
these costs through decisions related to the technical architecture and openness of the 
platform (e.g., Gawer, 2014; Boudreau, 2010; Tiwana, 2015). In particular, prior work has 
focused primarily on how technological features such as distance from the technological 
frontier (Anderson, Parker, and Tan, 2013; Claussen, Essling, and Kretschmer, 2015), 
modularity (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996, Tiwana, 2015), and the extent of connectedness 
between the platform and its components (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017) —influences the 
costs of affiliating with and innovating on a platform.  
Within the platform strategy literature, our research builds in particular on recent 
work that has examined how the characteristics of complementors and their strategic 
decisions interact with the architecture of the platform to shape the costs of affiliation. 
These have included the experience of complementors (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), the 
connectedness of complementors to the platform and broader ecosystem (Agarwal and 
Kapoor, 2018), the nature of the vertical relationships between the platform and 
complementor (Cennamo, Ozalp, and Kretschmer, 2018), and the use of development tools 
(Cennamo, Ozalp, and Kretschmer, 2018). While we similarly focus on “supply-side” 
features of complementors, our research is unique in its focus on their human capital, a key 
and thus far unexplored issue. In this way, our research will have important implications 
for the human capital and platform affiliation decisions of software firms.  
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Our results also have implications for platform owners. Understanding where and 
when firms multihome is important because it influences market-level outcomes such as 
the likelihood whether a market will tip and become a winner-take-all market (e.g., Corts 
and Lederman, 2009; Landsman and Stremersch, 2011). Prior research on multihoming has 
focused on demand-side explanations for multihoming, in particular the role of cross-side 
network effects (e.g., Corts and Lederman, 2009; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2007). 
However, our results show that even when cross-side network effects are growing, not all 
complementors may be able to respond quickly and seize the opportunity (Teece, 2007). 
While much of the recent empirical work on platform ecosystems has focused on 
consumer markets such as mobile applications and video games (e.g., Kapoor and Agarwal, 
2017; Agarwal and Kapoor, 2018; Cennamo, Ozalp, and Kretschmer, 2018), our focus on 
complementarities among human capital investments will have implications across a wide 
range of enterprise software markets. This focus on enterprise software is valuable for 
several reasons. First, enterprise software platforms are economically important—one 
recent estimate put the size of the SAP “economy” at $204 billion (Mirchandani, 2014) and 
another recently argued that Salesforce and its partner ecosystem will generate more than 
$859 billion in new revenues worldwide by 2022 (Prince, 2017).  Further, the problem of 
integrating applications with business processes enabled by platforms will be a significant 
one for many rapidly growing platforms that connect devices enabled by the “Internet of 





3.2 Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Strategic Human Capital 
Our theory used to explain multihoming is based on a microfoundational approach 
toward firm capabilities. Prior literature has shown that the nature of a firm’s human capital 
and how individuals endowed with different skills interact will affect a firm’s overall 
ability to pursue its strategies (Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 2001; Mayer, Somaya, and 
Williamson, 2012). We build on this literature and focus on the human capital deployed in 
developing solutions for a platform’s customers. This approach lets us consider both the 
nature of skills residing in the individual and the mechanisms through which individual 
knowledge gets combined to form firm capabilities. Knowledge, in this context, does not 
reside in a single person, but is distributed across individuals. Hence, organizational 
knowledge comes not only from individuals who are specialized in a task, but also from 
the various activities that relate the tasks and combine them into a productive routine 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). In line with recent discussions on the microfoundations of 
strategy research, we analyze interactional effects associated with human capital on firm-
level decisions (Barney and Felin, 2013). 
3.2.2 Developing a Complementary Solution – An Illustration 
Complementors to platform ecosystems must combine multiple types of human 
capital to interface with the platform. We provide a motivating example to clarify this issue. 
Company XYZ is a typical complementor within an ERP platform ecosystem who is 
developing an accounting solution for the retail industry. Producing software that is 
complementary to ERP and integrating it with the platform requires multiple skills. First, 
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there is a need to understand the retail industry. Each industry has a unique set of business 
processes and accounting systems and the complementor must capture these nuances while 
recording transactions. Hence, XYZ must possess the necessary industry knowledge 
industry to serve the needs of its customers. 
Second, the functionality provided by the accounting solution needs to be 
implemented within a particular ERP platform. XYZ must have the skills to understand the 
functionalities and processes of the underlying platform, and then extend these 
functionalities in ways that will both serve its customers and seamlessly integrate with the 
platform.16  
Third, development of complementary products and services for a platform requires 
individuals who have significant knowledge about the technical complexity involved in 
creating a software solution. Examples include coding skills related to developing the 
graphical user interface, logic for manipulating the data, and structures for storing data. 
To summarize, developing an accounting solution for the retail industry on an ERP 
platform requires our company XYZ to invest in three different forms of human capital. 
We depict the interrelationships between these different forms of human capital in 
Appendix Figure A3.1. As we will discuss next, this puts firms specialized in any one form 
of human capital at a disadvantage when seeking to multihome.  
3.2.3 Modularity and Interdependencies among Human Capital 
An open question is whether modular platform architectures reduce the need for 
complementors to invest in multiple types of human capital. Modularity enables 
                                                 
16 For example, knowledge of how the platform handles multi-currency accounting might help the 
platform to develop country-specific solutions. 
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independence across technical modules even though there could be interdependence within 
each module (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Modular designs within platforms can facilitate 
more widespread participation from complementors by reducing the set of technical 
interdependencies among modules (e.g., Tiwana et al., 2010). This means that while the 
core product and the complementor solution can have technical interdependencies within 
themselves, there are minimal technical interdependencies between the core product and 
the complementor solution.  This reduces the costs to complementors of technically 
integrating their solution with the underlying platform. Thus, the use of modularity within 
a platform can reduce the needs for complementors to invest in certain kinds of technical 
human capital.  
While modularity brings down technical interdependencies, it does not 
automatically resolve the interdependencies between the technical aspects of the solution 
and other aspects such as those related to functions, processes, and industry. This often 
requires firms to draw their knowledge boundaries broader than the operational technical 
boundaries (Colfer and Baldwin, 2016) and invest not only in technical human capital but 
also in functional and industry human capital. As industry experts (Jacobson, 2005) put it, 
“The ins and outs of the system are byzantine … you at least need the 
industry knowledge” … 
“Many of the individuals entering this field are business majors who have 
limited programming skills but are knowledgeable in their fields and in 
business process re-engineering. This also means that industry or 
functional knowledge is the most important prerequisite for a consultant.” 
 
This is consistent with recent work suggesting that technological skills may be necessary 
but not sufficient to build capabilities in software development (Chatterjee, 2017).  In the 
case of ERP platform ecosystems, the underlying costs of affiliation are high because firms 
are required to master not only the technical challenges of interfacing with the platform but 
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also the industry environment of the platform’s users and their business processes, leading 
to interdependencies in the corresponding task structure. In short, modular platform 
architectures do not obviate the need for complementors to invest in multiple types of 
human capital to produce for a platform.  
3.2.4 Knowledge Decomposability and the Coordination Problem 
The interdependencies highlighted above have important implications for a 
complementor’s decision to affiliate with a platform. Since knowledge required to develop 
software in these ecosystems often cuts across the three forms of human capital, it is 
complex and non-decomposable (Simon, 1962). To absorb and apply such knowledge, 
firms are required to bring together diverse forms of human capital, which leads to 
difficulties in coordination (Carlile, 2002, 2004).  
For example, since all technical consultants undergo similar professional training 
and are also trained in similar tasks at the workplace, they tend to share a certain common 
language. However, when technical consultants and functional consultants try to interact, 
communication becomes more difficult because of the lack of a common language (Grant, 
1996). Second, lack of expertise in the other field impairs the ability to track performance. 
For example, technical consultants may have a private incentive to overestimate the effort 
needed to implement a certain design made by the functional consultant. And, functional 
consultants may be unable to gauge the exact level of effort needed to complete a specific 
technical task. This could lead to other potential problems that get manifested in the form 
of shirking and free-riding.  
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3.2.5 Generalist vs. Specialists and Multihoming 
The existence of these coordination costs motivates our first hypothesis regarding the 
advantages of generalists over specialists in multihoming. This argument is based on the 
premise that the fundamental task of an organization is to coordinate the efforts of many 
individual specialists (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996). There are several ways 
that firms can achieve these aims. They can put in place internal knowledge sharing 
initiatives and suitably reward employees for articulating some of their tacit knowledge in 
common forums. Further, they can rotate jobs so that individuals with varied expertise are 
able to coordinate with each other more frequently. In sum, given the size of coordination 
costs and the nature of the mechanisms to reduce them, it would be difficult for firms that 
are specialized in a particular form of human capital to replicate them by contracting for 
them on external markets.   
In other words, due to the nature of knowledge and associated coordination costs, the 
different forms of human capital required to multihome are cospecialized.  With 
cospecialization, the marginal impact of possessing a certain form of human capital at the 
firm level on the ability to multihome is likely to be improved by an increase in any of the 
other forms of human capital involved in software development. That is, firms with deep 
expertise in all key forms of human capital are better equipped for integrating their solution 
with the platform. Firms who specialize in only one form of human capital are therefore 
less likely to multihome.  To summarize, we formulate the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis1: The higher the specialization in any one form of human capital, the 
lower the firm’s propensity to multihome. 
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3.2.6 Ecosystem Learning and Multihoming 
The two-sided nature of platform ecosystems has unique implications for 
complementor learning. Complementors learn not only independently – e.g. when learning 
how to interact as a team (e.g., Reagans, Argote, and Brooks, 2005) – but also learn from 
two sources within the ecosystem: the platform owner and the customers that the 
complementors serve through the platform.17  
Complementors learn as a result of their interactions with the platform owner, using 
them to refine their software development process to ensure that the software solution is 
synchronized with the platform owner’s core product. One source of such learning will 
come from the need for complementors to respond to changes in the platform (Kapoor and 
Agarwal, 2017; Foerderer et al., 2017). For example, ecosystem complexity will often 
increase over time, increasing the interactions between complementor products and those 
of other components within the ecosystem (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). Within the context 
of enterprise software, changes in the interfaces to and functionality within the core 
platform can require changes by the complementor (Foerderer et al., 2017). 
Complementors who produce for platform ecosystems such as enterprise software also seek 
certification from the platform owner as to the quality of the solution and its ability to 
interface with the core platform (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013).  
All of these interactions between the complementor and members of the platform 
ecosystem require the exchange of knowledge across significant knowledge boundaries 
(Carlile, 2004). Knowledge-sharing and associated supporting routines between platform 
                                                 
17 While here we focus on “external learning” with partners within the ecosystem, we will later explore 
the robustness of our analysis to controls for “internal learning” that does not require coordination with 
partners. 
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owners and their partners will critically determine the extent of value co-created in the 
context of business software ecosystems (Sarker et al., 2012; Grover and Kohli, 2012). 
These activities can involve semi-formalized interactions that enable brokering between 
the platform owner and complementor, as well as individualized knowledge boundary 
resources that facilitate frequent exchange of information between the platform and 
complementors (Foerderer et al., 2017). Complementors develop over time complementary 
interaction routines enhancing their absorptive capacity that allow them to transfer valuable 
knowledge across organizational boundaries (Dyer and Singh, 1998). These routines can 
also be deployed when multihoming. 
Complementors also learn from their interactions with customers who are affiliated 
with the platform. In the case of enterprise software, the implementation of software built 
by complementors and associated business process innovation requires complementary 
innovation by users (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1996; Von Hippel, 2005). Complementors 
will develop routines to facilitate interaction with customers. They will also learn best 
practices for different types of customers. Because complementors are often smaller firms 
who are resource constrained, we argue that these learning opportunities are facilitated by 
partnering with a platform and participating in the ecosystem. When the platform owners 
license the core product they will often suggest complementary solutions from third party 
firms, thereby generating leads for complementors (e.g., Wilcox and Yemen, 2011) and 
opportunities for learning from customers. 
Through repeated engagements, complementors will develop competencies around 
spanning boundaries with customers. Knowledge transfer between ERP complementors 
and clients is arduous, and there are specific practices that can be applied to facilitate 
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learning and knowledge transfer between complementors and clients (Ko, Kirsch, and 
King, 2005). Complementors not only learn how to interact with a specific customer but 
build a broader capability that can be deployed in other customer facing projects in the 
future (Ethiraj et al., 2005).18  
More broadly, the process of engaging in repeated development projects enables 
complementors to understand how to deploy their human capital in a way that makes it 
efficient to handle such boundary spanning activities. Complementors will be able to 
transfer many of the lessons learned from these engagements to a new platform, thereby 
increasing the benefits to multihoming. To summarize, we predict that learning acquired 
over time from ‘external’ sources in the ecosystem, namely platform owners and 
customers, increases the (net) benefits to multihoming.19  We therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The longer the duration of partnership with a given platform, the 
greater the propensity of the firm to engage in multihoming. 
 
                                                 
18 An example of knowledge exchange between a complementor and client is the case of The Hershey 
Company. In 1997 Hershey decided to replace its mainframe systems with SAP’s ERP product along with 
complementary solutions for inventory, transportation, supply chain and forecasting applications from 
software provider Manugistics. For Manugistics to succeed in the implementation, it needed to 
understand the SAP system and the data that was generated as output from or had to be fed as input into 
SAP. Repeated participation in such challenging integration with the platform owner reinforced 
Manugistics’ integration learning and enabled the complementor to learn how to integrate its solution 
with any platform. The Hershey case also illustrates the complexity of the ERP platform ecosystem and 
provides a cautionary tale on how ERP deployments could go wrong if platform owners, complementors, 
and customers fail to come together and address the challenges concerning integration. 
19 Beyond these mechanisms, we acknowledge that longer partnership duration may be associated with 
higher transaction costs due to increased relationship-specific investments by the complementor. We 
discuss how this possibility along with other alternative mechanisms could affect our empirical findings in 
a later section. 
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3.2.7 The Interaction between Partnership Duration and Human Capital 
Despite the benefits from ecosystem learning, we argue that the impact of 
partnership duration will not be the same across all complementors. It is useful here to 
summarize the key mechanism behind hypothesis 1. As pointed out earlier, integrating a 
solution with a platform involves not only the accumulation of technical, functional or 
industry knowledge but involves the understanding of elements that lie at the intersection 
of these different aspects. Major problems that specialized knowledge poses to 
organizations are actually found at such knowledge boundaries (Carlile, 2002). When the 
problem being solved is complex and less-decomposable (Simon, 1962), high interaction 
across the three forms of human capital becomes important, giving rise to 
cospecialization. Given this context, firms pursuing a market form of governance are at a 
disadvantage in integrating knowledge (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), which, as 
hypothesized earlier, also put them at a disadvantage in multihoming. 
However, as the partnership evolves, the key mechanism that provides an 
advantage to generalists in multihoming to begin with will become more important due to 
path dependence in knowledge accumulation and organizational learning. Indeed, even 
though partnership duration is likely to improve learning in complementors on average, 
specialists will tend to learn less than generalists.  
Prior literature suggests that firms can develop an organizational competence in 
spanning boundaries of diverse professional and organizational settings (Grant, 1996; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; von Hippel, 1988).  Knowledge accumulated over 
a period of time can also be shaped through path-dependence of organizational knowledge 
development (Levinthal and March, 1993; Sydow et al., 2009). For generalists, such 
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organizational competence will be the result of two interrelated processes. First, generalists 
will expand their internal knowledge base at the intersection of the different forms of 
human capital. Second, organizational knowledge will be reinforced over time as 
generalists draw on and use knowledge integration practices aimed at reducing 
coordination costs stemming from the possession of more diverse human capital 
(Orlikowski, 2002).  Path-dependency may be located in both the knowledge base of the 
firm and in the associated knowledge management routines carried out to transfer and share 
knowledge (Coombs and Hull, 1998). Both of these sources of knowledge can be leveraged 
by generalists when affiliating with a different platform ecosystem. 
Specialists, in turn, will not be able to accumulate knowledge at the intersection of 
different forms of human capital. Moreover, while they may be able to develop knowledge 
integration practices to reduce coordination costs in cooperation with ecosystem partners, 
these practices are costlier to be implemented using market transactions and cannot easily 
be leveraged with a different set of partners as required by multihoming. Hence, we predict 
that, even though ability to multihome improves with partnership duration on average, 
firms specialized in one form of human capital would be less able to take advantage of the 
accumulated knowledge and knowledge integration practices in the new setting. 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of partnership duration with a platform on multihoming 






3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Empirical Setting.  
We test these hypotheses in the ERP platform ecosystem setting. Within the ERP 
ecosystem, SAP and Oracle are the dominant platform owners that develop and license the 
core ERP product to end customers. Just as developers develop apps in the mobile 
ecosystem and choose whether to do so only on Apple or Android or both (multihome), 
ERP complementors face similar choices with regard to SAP and Oracle. However, 
products and services on the ERP platform are complex and require some combination of 
functional, technical and industry human capital to deliver solutions.   
We use a key feature of our research setting: the ecosystem witnessed a series of 
platform-level acquisitions by Oracle during our sample period. We exploit Oracle’s 
acquisitions as a change in the benefits of multihoming that SAP complementors are 
heterogeneously able to take advantage of based on the skill characteristics of their 
employees prior to the change. 
3.3.2 Sample 
We have built a comprehensive dataset on the ERP platform ecosystem based on 
several secondary data sources. The dataset covers the years 2001-2006 that marked the 
rise of Oracle as an ERP platform owner and the subsequent intense rivalry between SAP 
and Oracle. This is especially important given that we are interested in events that shift the 
value of multihoming. We discuss this aspect in more detail in the identification section. 
To identify complementors and their multihoming decisions, we first obtained a list 
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of SAP partners. SAP maintains an active partner website that contains information on 
complementors that offer solutions based on the SAP ERP product. However, limiting the 
partners to ones from the current SAP’s partner website is likely to induce a survivorship 
bias. Hence, we augmented the list of firms by adding exhibitors from past SAP 
SAPPHIRE and SAP Insider annual meetings.  
We decided to focus on US-based complementors in order to ensure that firms 
within the sample are comparable and because some of our control variables are available 
only for US firms. We use press releases data from Factiva to identify the year of 
partnership formation with SAP. We relied on keyword based searches to identify the press 
releases related to both SAP and the complementor firm. We took each firm from the list 
of SAP complementors built earlier and checked for the earliest date in which the firm and 
SAP occurred together in a press release. The assumption made here is that if a 
complementor is mentioned along with SAP in a press release, the partnership between 
SAP and the complementor is at least as old as the press release. After comparing the press 
release information obtained from Factiva with the one from Lexis Nexis for 10% of the 
sample, we found Factiva to be much better in terms of both coverage and precision. Hence, 
we chose to use Factiva. The same approach was used for obtaining the year of 
multihoming (affiliating with the Oracle platform).  
For obtaining detailed micro-level data on human capital, we downloaded CVs of 
both present and past employees of the partner firms from a popular online professional 
network. We also obtained data on firm sales and firm size from the National Establishment 
Time Series (NETS) database. It is a time series of the archival Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) 
database and contains information on close to 50 million unique establishments between 
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1990 and 2013. The dataset covers both private and public establishments and contains 
information on the establishment tree that enables us to aggregate sales and employee data 
to the firm level. We matched the list of SAP partners with the NETS database and ended 
up with 1,012 DUNS numbers for headquarters which corresponded to 45,339 target 
establishments. We used the tree structure to aggregate the establishment data back to the 
firm level. We retained only those complementor firms that had less than 5000 employees 
at the time of partnering with SAP to reduce the extent of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
sample. The unit of observation in our sample is the firm-year.  
3.3.3 Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is multihoming which takes either zero or one as its value. 
Multihoming starts with zero when a complementor firm enters into a partnership with the 
SAP ERP platform and turns into one if and when the firm enters into a partnership with 
the Oracle platform. If the firm never multihomes, the variable remains at zero until the 
end of the sample.  
3.3.4 Independent Variables 
We seek to investigate how firms’ ex ante endowments of human capital allow 
them to take advantage of new opportunities for multihoming. We construct separate 
variables corresponding to each of these three types of human capital specialization: 
functional, technical and industry. Here we provide an overview of our approach; more 
details are available in the Appendix.  
First, we identify a set of keywords that are associated with a specific form of 
human capital. We identify keywords for the different forms of human capital from 
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resources that are publicly available on SAP’s own support website.20  
Second, we search within the employee CV data for the keywords identified above 
and count all relevant instances of their appearance. To do this, we first identify the 
individuals employed with the sample company in a given year.  Next, we count the total 
number of appearances of each of the keywords (identified earlier) within the CVs of the 
relevant individuals. The number of keywords found in a CV may depend on its total 
length. To control for this effect, we divide the keyword match count by the number of 
words in the CV. In order to account for the obsolescence of knowledge over time, we limit 
ourselves to the knowledge accumulated over the five years prior to the firm-year under 
consideration. We repeat this procedure for each and every individual identified as a valid 
employee of the focal firm in a given year.  
Third, we aggregate the individual capabilities to the firm level to obtain a firm-
year measure for each form of human capital. We first add up the skills across the 
employees and then bring the skill values to the per-employee level by dividing by the 
number of employees in the sample. Though more complex aggregation approaches are 
possible, this simple form of aggregation is consistent with the microfoundational view of 
firm strategy (Barney and Felin, 2013). For each of the three types of human capital, we 
compute the stock as of 2001 and then create a dummy variable that is equal to one when 
the value of that type of human capital exceeds the 75th percentile within its category. We 
provide further details on these three variables below.  
                                                 
20 For example, SAP architecture-related terms such as ABAP and NetWeaver and coding languages such 
as Java and C++ correspond to technical human capital; Automotive, Utilities and Banking are some of the 
industries where these ERP products are implemented; and Materials Management (MM) and Plant 
Maintenance (PM) are some of the functional modules within the ERP product. 
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3.3.4.1 Technical Human Capital  
Technical human capital enables the firm to develop an understanding of the 
technical architecture of a platform. This knowledge is useful in developing code fragments 
that interact with and add value to the underlying platform.  
3.3.4.2 Functional Human Capital 
Functional human capital is essential to grasp the business process flows built into 
an ERP platform. An end-to-end business process usually involves several steps that are 
carried out by individuals spread across an organization. It often cuts across several 
modules within the ERP platform as well as those built by complementors. An individual 
specialized in functional human capital understands the particular way in which a business 
process such as procure-to-pay is implemented within the ERP platform.  
3.3.4.3 Industry Human Capital 
Knowledge-based work is often carried out with a certain industry context (Mayer, 
Somaya and Williamson, 2012). The same is true for the development and deployment of 
ERP-based products and services. Industry human capital may simply be thought of as the 
skills required to adapt such products and services to an industry context. 
3.3.4.4 Specialized Firm 
We designate as specialist firms those who are above the 75th percentile in one and 
only one of the human capital measures described above. Our measure of specialist firm is 
equal to one when the firm is specialized in only one type of human capital, and zero 
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otherwise.   
3.3.4.5 Acquisition Time Window (ATW) 
In order to capture the effect of announcements regarding platform-level 
acquisitions by Oracle, we use a dichotomous variable that is equal to one during the ATW 
(which is defined as three years immediately following the first acquisition related 
announcement, which occurred in 2004) and is zero otherwise.  
3.3.4.6 Duration of Partnership (Duration)  
The duration of partnership is equal to the number of years spent with the SAP 
platform as of the start of the ATW.  
3.3.4.7 Control Variables 
We control for the number of firm employees and total firm sales. It has been shown 
in the literature that these two variables control for a vast array of firm capabilities and, 
hence, have considerable potential to influence firm strategies. In our setting, we can think 
of firm sales as a proxy for the quality of the complementor product. 
3.3.5 Identification 
A potential challenge that we face is omitted variable bias: human capital 
investment measures at the firm level may be correlated with the benefits of affiliating with 
a different platform.  Rather than examine the in-sample correlation between human capital 
investment and multihoming, we fix our human capital variables at pre-sample levels and 
instead examine heterogeneity in response to an exogenous demand shock that increased 
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the benefits of joining the Oracle platform, based upon the ex-ante human capital 
investments within the firm.  
We use a fixed effects model that controls for time invariant firm-level 
unobservables and time dummies that control for events that are common across firms in 
any given year.  Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that, even if the shock 
could have been anticipated, it is difficult for firms to change their human capital mix in 
the short run using the labor market because it takes time for teams to learn to work 
together.21  
Our exogenous shock is based upon a series of acquisitions made by Oracle. 
Starting in 2004 with the acquisition of PeopleSoft, Oracle made a series of application 
platform acquisitions to inorganically increase its market share within a short period of 
time (Bloomberg, 2011). The acquisition of PeopleSoft was initially valued at $11 billion, 
which was then the largest ever acquisition within the IT industry. This attracted the 
attention of antitrust authorities both in the US and Europe. But, in 2004, the US courts 
ruled in favor of Oracle and against the Department of Justice. This was soon followed by 
a similar judgement in Europe. Not only were these developments pivotal in Oracle’s 
inorganic growth strategy, but they also represented a strong signal for complementors 
thinking about partnering with Oracle. They meant that Oracle partners had access to 
significantly larger demand than had previously been the case.  
While partnering with Oracle represented a significant opportunity, joining the new 
platform was not an easy undertaking for SAP partners. We make use of heterogeneity 
                                                 
21 We test the robustness of this assumption by replacing the HC values obtained as of the beginning of 
the sample (2001) with the HC values based on the last year of the sample (2006). We find that there is no 
systematic variation in the HC values across the years and our initial results continue to hold. 
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across firms in human capital to identify how different pre-acquisition firm characteristics 
related to human capital influenced a change in the propensity to multihome during and 
after the acquisitions. Indeed, even though all firms are subject to the exogenous shock, 
according to our theory, the ones that are highly specialized in any one form of human 
capital are expected to be less responsive to the shock.  
3.3.6 Estimation Methodology 
We use a panel data linear probability model (LPM) with firm level fixed effects 
(Wooldridge, 2001) for estimation. Our use of the LPM rather than a nonlinear model (e.g., 
probit or logit) reflects several considerations. Most importantly, the LPM will deliver 
consistent estimates of the parameter of interest (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). A major 
drawback will be the existence of heteroskedastic standard errors, which we address using 
robust standard errors. The LPM allows us to difference out the firm-level fixed effects 
without loss of observations in our dataset (as would be the case with a probit or logit, for 
example). Further, the linear model allows for more straightforward interpretations of 
implied marginal effects from our parameter estimates: Our models include interaction 
terms, and the signs of the interaction terms do not identify the signs of the marginal effects 
in nonlinear models (Ai and Norton 2003; Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen 2009; 
Zelner, 2009). Further, while models such as the conditional fixed effects logit allow 
conditioning on firm effects, they are not amenable to the computation of marginal effects 
(Greene, 2017). Last, nonlinear models may be inconsistent when there are a large number 
of zeroes in the dependent variable, as there are in our sample (King and Zeng, 2001). In 
the Appendix we provide results from survival models and they are qualitatively robust.  
We treat multihoming as the final absorbing state under the assumption that a 
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multihoming partner does not leave the new platform ecosystem (Oracle) at a later point in 
time. The continued presence of these partners on the Oracle partner site confirms our 
assumption. Hence, we delete all observations post-multihoming and structure the data as 
an unbalanced panel. Further, we drop firms who partnered with SAP after the ATW, as 
there will be no variation in the key variables of interest: the interaction of the ATW with 
human capital and the duration of partnership. In sum, we have 1020 observations from 
226 firms. 
3.4 Results 
Table 3.1 shows the basic summary statistics while Table 3.2 reports the correlations. 
Specialized firms constitute approximately 30% of our sample. The mean of partnership 
duration prior to the start of the ATW is approximately 4.6 years. As one might expect, the 
correlation between the logged values of employee count and sales is quite high. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Multihoming Dichotomous variable (equals 1 when the firm 
multihomes and stays 0 otherwise) 0.029 0.169 0 1 
Log Employees Log Transformation of Number of Employees 2.504 2.753 0 12.35 
Log Sales Log Transformation of Sales Revenues 9.936 7.637 0 24.23 
Specialist Firm Firms above the 75th percentile on only one of the 
three forms of Human Capital namely Technical, 
Functional or Industry 0.300 0.458 0 1 
Partnership 
Duration 
Duration of Partnership with SAP (difference 
between the year 2004 and the start of partnership) 4.571 2.391 0 10 
Age at Partnership Firm age at the beginning of partnership with SAP 3.586 4.408 0 15 
Technical HC Firms above the 75th percentile on  Technical HC 0.253 0.435 0 1 
Industry HC Firms above the 75th percentile on  Industry HC 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Functional HC Firms above the 75th percentile on  Functional HC 0.249 0.433 0 1 
Number of Firms: 226; Number of Observations: 1020 
     
Table 3.2 Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Multihoming 1         
(2) Log Employees -0.02 1        
(3) Log Sales -0.01 0.85 1       
(4) Specialist Firm 0.00 0.00 -0.01 1      
(5) Partnership 
Duration 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.00 1     
(6) Age at 
Partnership 0.05 0.42 0.58 -0.11 -0.17 1    
(7) Technical HC -0.06 -0.11 -0.08 0.1 -0.09 -0.08 1   
(8) Industry HC -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.27 1  
(9) Functional HC -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.08 -0.08 0.16 0.17 1 
 
Our shock is relevant. In Figure 3.1, we show graphically that the ATW had a 
positive effect on multihoming. The coefficients plotted in the graph are based on a linear 
regression with multihoming as the dependent variable and the sample year dummies as 
independent variables.   We also interact the specialized firm variable with every year 
dummy. We clearly find that (1) there is an increase in multihoming during the time 
window and (2) the coefficients for specialized firms x year dummy are lower than those 
of other firms x year dummy during the window.  
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Note: Each point on the above graph represents the coefficient on the year dummy corresponding to the two types of 
complementors. The values are relative to the base year of 2001 for generalist complementors. 
Figure 3.1 Effect of the Acquisition Time Window on Multihoming 
 
Table 3.3 H1: Effect of the Acquisition Time Window on Multihoming for 
Specialists vs Generalists 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Multihoming Specialized Firm With controls 
   
Log Employees  0.005 
  (0.006) 
  [0.373] 
Log Sales  -0.003 
  (0.002) 
  [0.083] 
Specialist Firm X ATW -0.056 -0.057 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
 [0.010] [0.010] 
Constant -0.012 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
 [0.233] [0.531] 
   
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Observations 1,020 1,020 
Number of Firms 226 226 
R-squared 0.067 0.070 
R-squared (with effect of fixed effects) 0.616 0.617 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
















We next present our regression results. We first present results showing the effects 
of specialization and duration separately and use these as the source of tests for Hypothesis 
1 and 2. However, each of these models contain omitted variables: duration in the case of 
tests for the effects of specialization and vice versa. Our full model, that is consistent with 
our theoretical framework, is the one that contains the effects of specialization, duration, 
and their interaction. These will represent the primary results of the paper.  
Our first set of regression results include the interaction of our dummy for specialist 
firm with a separate indicator for whether the observation is in the ATW. The results in 
Table 3.3 show that specialized firms have a lower propensity to multihome after the ATW 
shock by 5.6 (p-value 0.010) to 5.7 (p-value 0.010) percentage points, which is in line with 
hypothesis 1.  
In our motivation for Hypothesis 1 we describe how the reason for the weaker 
response of specialists to the demand shock is due to the need for all three types of human 
capital in order to produce for the new platform. To examine the empirical salience of this 
explanation, we use our data to test for the presence of complementarities among the three 
sources of human capital. Table 3.4 captures the interaction effects among the different 
measures of human capital and ATW.22  
Specialization in any of the three types of human capital—technical, functional, and 
industry—is associated with a weaker response to the demand shock. That is, the 
coefficient estimates of each of these variables with ATW is negative. However, the three-
way interactions between any of the two types of human capital and the ATW are positive. 
  
                                                 
22 Note that individual effect of the HCs in themselves are not identified since we employ a fixed effects 
regression with pre-shock HC values corresponding to each firm. 
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Table 3.4 H1: Effect of the Acquisition Time Window on Multihoming depending on 
different HC profiles 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Functional HC - 
Industry HC 
Interaction 
Technical HC - 
Industry HC 
Interaction 
    
Log Employees 0.007 0.008 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.285] [0.218] [0.476] 
Log Sales -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.132] [0.087] [0.176] 
Technical HC X ATW -0.058  -0.049 
 (0.031)  (0.034) 
 [0.065]  [0.151] 
Functional HC X ATW -0.084 -0.090  
 (0.022) (0.023)  
 [0.000] [0.000]  
Technical HC X Functional HC X ATW 0.061   
 (0.032)   
 [0.062]   
Industry HC X ATW  -0.088 -0.077 
  (0.022) (0.020) 
  [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry HC X Functional HC X ATW  0.090  
  (0.023)  
  [0.000]  
Technical HC X Industry HC X ATW   0.051 
   (0.035) 
   [0.139] 
Constant -0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
 [0.865] [0.879] [0.776] 
    
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 
Number of Firms 226 226 226 
R-squared 0.082 0.090 0.077 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.622 0.626 0.620 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
ATW: Acquisition time window (2004-2006). Estimates based on the linear probability model. 
 
This provides evidence in support of complementarity between the different forms 
of human capital. For example, column 1 shows that if a firm only has technical human 
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capital then the likelihood of multihoming after the ATW declines by 5.8 percentage points 
(p-value 0.065). However, if the firm also has functional human capital then the net effect 
of possessing both forms of human capital is approximately 0.  
Table 3.5 H2 & H3: Effect of the Acquisition Time Window on Multihoming 
depending on partnership duration and its interaction with Specialists vs 
Generalists 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Multihoming Duration 
Duration-Specialization 
Interaction 
      
Log Employees 0.004 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.512] [0.349] 
Log Sales -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.125] [0.058] 
Specialist Firm X ATW  0.038 
  (0.047) 
  [0.419] 
ATW X Partnership Duration 0.006 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
 [0.155] [0.063] 
Specialist Firm X ATW X Partnership 
Duration  -0.018 
  (0.008) 
  [0.024] 
Constant 0.012 0.016 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
 [0.180] [0.090] 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Observations 1,020 1,020 
Number of Firms 226 226 
R-squared 0.061 0.076 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.613 0.620 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in 
brackets.   
ATW: Acquisition time window (2004-2006). Estimates based on the linear probability model. 
 
This is consistent with the views of an industry expert that we interviewed (quoted below) 
and reiterates the point that in our context different forms of HC are cospecialized. In 
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particular, these results emphasize the importance of knowledge of business processes and 
the industry to ERP systems in addition to technical knowledge.  
“The business analyst [functional HC] acts as some kind of a bridge 
between the industry consultants and the software developers [technical 
HC]” 
 
We next analyze the results corresponding to hypothesis 2 concerning the impact 
of partnership duration on multihoming. Column 1 shows that the interaction term between 
ATW and duration is positive (p-value 0.155). To understand the economic impact of 
partnership duration on multihoming, we computed the predicted probability of 
multihoming for firms before and after the shock based upon whether or not their 
partnership duration was above the median. For firms whose partnership duration is below 
the median, the demand shock increased the predicted probability of multihoming by 2.8 
percentage points—from 1.0% to 3.8%. For those whose partnership duration is above the 
median, the demand shock increased the predicted probability by 6.0 percentage points—
from 0.1% to 6.1%. This is consistent with hypothesis 2.  
The second column in Table 3.5 includes the interactions between duration, 
specialization, and ATW. This is our fully specified model and represents the primary 
results of our paper. We find that the marginal effect of partnership duration on the 
likelihood of multihoming is lower for specialized firms (coefficient -0.018; p-value 
0.024), which is in line with the prediction from Hypothesis 3. To understand the size of 
these effects, we compute the marginal effects of ATW for firms with partnership duration 
below and above the median, but also compare the results for specialists and generalists.  
As a result of the demand shock, the predicted probability of multihoming increases 
by 2.9 percentage points for specialists with short term partnership and by 0.6 percentage 
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points for specialists with long term partnerships. In contrast, however, as a result of the 
demand shock the predicted probability of multihoming increases by 2.7 percentage points 
for generalists with short term partnerships but increases by a sizeable 8.4 percentage 
points for generalists with long term partnerships. In short, the marginal effects of duration 
during the ATW are larger for generalists than specialists, which is consistent with H3.  
We can also use these results as a source of tests for Hypothesis 1 and 2. Evaluating 
the marginal effect of being a specialist at the mean value of partnership duration (4.571) 
yields a marginal effect of -0.044 (=0.038 – 0.018*4.571, p-value = 0.048), which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. The difference between the marginal effect of being a 
specialist for long and short duration is striking. When duration is 0, the marginal effect of 
being a specialist is 0.038 (p-value 0.419), while when duration is at the 75th percentile 
(duration=7) the marginal effect is -0.088 (p-value 0.001).  
We next discuss whether our results for the fully specified model provide support 
for Hypothesis 2. The marginal effect of partnership duration at mean values of being a 
specialist (0.3) is equal to 0.006 (=0.011-0.018*0.3, p-value = 0.177), which is similar to 
the estimate in column 1 of Table 3.5 in economic and statistical significance. Thus the 
point estimate is consistent with Hypothesis 2, but not at conventional thresholds of 
statistical significance. This result is in part because a significant portion of the sample is 
comprised of specialists who receive fewer benefits from partnership duration. Among 




3.4.1 Robustness Checks 
3.4.1.1 Nonlinear Models  
In our baseline models we use the LPM to examine the effects of specialization and 
duration on multihoming. As robustness we model these effects using hazard models. 
These directly model time to event, relaxing the normality assumption imposed in linear 
regression and providing an approach to address censoring (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1999). 
We use the Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox model is semiparametric, making no 
assumptions of the baseline hazard over time and assuming that covariates multiplicatively 
shift the baseline hazard function. We present the estimates from the Cox model in Table 
A1.10. Directionally the estimates of the key parameters in the Cox models are similar to 
those in the baseline linear models. However, because the Cox is a nonlinear model with 
interactions, we cannot use the signs of the coefficients to directly test hypotheses (Ai and 
Norton, 2003). To test hypotheses and to understand the economic effects of changes in 
our key variables on outcomes, we study the effects of a change in our key variables on the 
log of the hazard rate. In other words, we examine the semi-elasticities of the hazard rate 
with respect to a change in each of the key variables of interest.  
We will briefly discuss the results of the fully specified model. The semi-elasticity 
of going from being a generalist to being a specialist when duration is 0 is actually positive, 
with a value of 2.124 (p-value 0.019). However, at the 75th percentile of duration 
(Duration=7 years) the semi-elasticity of becoming a specialist is negative, -1.814 (p-value 
0.048). Similarly the semi-elasticity of increases in partnership duration for generalists is 
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0.320 (p-value 0.000), while that for specialists is -0.424 (p-value 0.140). The value of 
learning for generalists is greater than that for specialists. In short, the results of our 
estimates using the Cox model is supportive of our hypotheses.  
3.4.1.2 Other Robustness Checks 
We carried out a number of other robustness checks. We check whether our results 
are sensitive to changes in length of the ATW, alternative ways of measuring partnership 
duration, and alternative cut-offs to our specialization dummy. Our results are robust to all 
of these changes. We further carry out a falsification exercise using an alternative time 
window to ATW in which there was not a demand shock to the Oracle platform ecosystem. 
In particular, we re-estimate the baseline model replacing the ATW window using a 
window indicating the dot com bubble. Our baseline results do not hold during this time 
window. Detailed results for all of these analyses are included in the Appendix. 
3.5 Alternative Explanations 
In this section we discuss three alternative explanations that have the potential to 
shape multihoming decisions and our results. We are unable to rule out the possibility that 
these explanations have some effect on our estimates. However, as we described in further 
detail below, we show these explanations often work against the findings in our paper, 
making it harder for us to find evidence in support of our hypotheses and the mechanisms 
described. They are also unable to provide an explanation for our complete set of results.  
3.5.1 Different types of learning 
In our development of hypothesis 2 we emphasized the learning that occurred 
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through repeated interactions with platform owner and customers. However, we are unable 
to observe these interactions directly. Rather our measure of learning is based on the 
partnership duration. Other types of learning could take place over time and which could 
facilitate the delivery of enterprise software. In particular, repeated interaction in prior 
engagements can lead to better team learning (Reagans, Argote and Brooks, 2005). Over 
time there is a solidification of roles and responsibilities within a complementor team and 
team members develop a sense of familiarity with regard to both the division of tasks and 
the coordination among those tasks. Such familiarity enables the team to arrive at a better 
division of labor. Also, teams tend to codify collective knowledge enhancing the 
performance of repetitive tasks (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
Though this latter type of learning is not dependent on the length of affiliation with 
the platform ecosystem, it will increase over time. As a result, it is a possible alternative 
explanation for the results that are in support of H2. To examine the salience of this 
alternative hypothesis, we explore a robustness check in which we include an additional 
variable that is equal to the age of the firm prior to the start of the partnership with the 
platform ecosystem. The logic of this variable is that it will capture early stage learning 
that will be particularly salient to the formation and coordination of teams. The mean of 
this variable is 3.6 years, with max 15. The correlation of this variable with partnership 
duration is low (-0.17). In column 2 of Appendix Table A1.6 we show that adding this 
variable does not affect the estimates in support of H2. Further, in column 3 of that table 
we re-estimate our full model on the subset of firms whose age at partnership is greater 
than 4 years. The logic behind doing this is that these firms will have already completed 
some team learning prior to the formation of the partnership. As a result, the estimates for 
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partnership duration are less likely to be contaminated by the effects of this type of early 
stage team learning. The parameter estimates for the key variables related to specialization 
and learning are qualitatively similar in this subsample in terms of economic and statistical 
significance. This lends further credence to the view that our estimates are capturing 
learning that occurs as a result of engagements with members of the platform ecosystem. 
We further note that while we are unable to rule out the effects of internal team learning 
influencing our partnership duration variable, such an explanation based upon team 
learning would be unable to explain our results in support of H3.  
3.5.2 Relationship-Specific and Cospecialized Investments 
Another alternative explanation is that our results reflect the effects of relationship-
specific or cospecialized investments with the platform. For example, in a software 
development context such as ours, it has been shown that firms develop both relationship-
specific capabilities as well as general capabilities through repeated engagements (Ethiraj 
et al., 2005). In our context, complementors may develop capabilities and routines for 
working with the platform owner and may refine these over time. While some of these 
capabilities and routines may be transferable to a new platform—a possibility that we 
describe in our motivation for Hypothesis 2—some may not be transferable and so the 
value of these capabilities and routines may be far less valuable in the new setting. 
However, if learning is relationship-specific, then that would lead to a prediction of a 
negative or no relationship between partnership duration and multihoming, not the positive 
relationship that we observe. 
A related issue is that our measure of specialization could be capturing relation-
specific investments in a particular type of human capital. For example, prior work has 
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emphasized the costs of integrating the software code between the platform and 
complementor (e.g., Anderson, Parker, and Tan, 2013; Cennamo, Ozalp, and Kretschmer, 
2018; Claussen, Essling, and Kretschmer, 2015; Gawer, 2014). Our measure of 
specialization – and our test of H1 – could therefore reflect the implications of technical 
investments that are specific to the platform. We explore this possibility in Table 3.4, in 
which we decompose human capital into its three constituent parts—technical human 
capital, functional human capital, and industry human capital. A key implication of the 
results in that table is that complementors need multiple types of human capital to 
multihome. In fact, the table shows that while the combination of technical and functional 
(column 1) and industry and functional (column 2) human capital both influence the 
likelihood of multihoming, technical and industry does not (column 3). In other words, the 
empirical evidence suggests that it is functional, not technical, human capital that is 
necessary for multihoming. This is consistent with our earlier discussion about the 
importance of functional knowledge to the development of enterprise software.  
3.5.3 Why do firms become specialists?  
Our results use variance in the extent to which complementors have general or 
specialized human capital at the beginning of our sample to determine the likelihood that 
they will respond to an exogenous shock by multihoming. Given the benefits to becoming 
a generalist, one question is whether firms choose to become specialists for reasons that 
could influence our results. 
Our research design does not enable us to determine the reasons for why firms 
become specialists or generalists. However, it does enable us to control for some obvious 
sources of bias that might arise from endogenous selection into being a generalist. Our 
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baseline estimates all use firm-level fixed effects, and our human capital computations are 
based on the stock up to 2001, the first year of our sample. As a result, we control for many 
sources of bias that could arise from firm-level time-constant unobservables that might 
influence selection into being a generalist. Further, our use of static human capital measures 
mean that they will not be changing in our sample in response to time-varying factors that 
might influence the likelihood of multihoming.  
While our empirical approach controls for firm-level time-invariant factors, there 
may exist time-varying factors that are differentially correlated with human capital 
investments and that could influence the likelihood of multihoming. For example, resource-
constrained complementors could choose to specialize in a particular type of human capital 
because it enables them to build a higher quality product, even when specialization makes 
it more difficult to integrate with the platform. However, if specialists have a higher quality 
product this would lead to a prediction that they would have a higher likelihood of 
multihoming in response to the demand shock, which is the opposite of what we observe. 
In other words, the presence of time-varying unobserved quality in the complementor’s 
products or solutions would induce a positive bias on the effect of human capital 
specialization on multihoming, while we find a negative effect. As for the case of 
transaction costs, while important omitted variables may affect the size of the analyzed 
effects, our qualitative findings remain robust due to the direction of the associated biases. 
In short, our estimation strategy allows us to control for many sources of bias that 
would arise from endogenous human capital investment decisions. While we acknowledge 
that understanding the reason for these decisions are of independent interest, we leave 
examination of this issue to future research.  
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3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
We investigate the responses of complementors to a demand-side opportunity arising 
from the consolidation of a competing platform. Complementors are more likely to 
multihome when they possess a set of cospecialized complementary assets. 
Complementors’ responses also depend upon the duration of their partnership with the pre-
existing platform. The evidence supports the view that there is learning that occurs as a 
result of partnership with the existing platform and this learning influences the response to 
the new opportunity. However, the response to learning is also greater for complementors 
with the requisite cospecialized assets. In particular, the evidence supports the view that 
complementors who are generalists develop capabilities at integrating knowledge across 
diverse forms of human capital and this increases their propensity to multihome relative to 
specialists.  
We contribute to a line of research within the platform ecosystem literature that 
explores how knowledge barriers and coordination costs influence the value of affiliating 
with a platform. In contrast to much of the work in this area that has focused on the 
implications of platform owner actions (e.g., Anderson, Parker, and Tan, 2013; Claussen, 
Essling, and Kretschmer, 2015; Gawer, 2014; Boudreau, 2010; Tiwana, 2015) we build on 
recent work that has focused on the characteristics of complementors and their strategic 
decisions (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017; Agarwal and Kapoor, 2018; Cennamo, Ozalp, and 
Kretschmer, 2018). However, by focusing on the human capital of complementors, we 
approach these questions from a unique perspective. 
Our research is also related to work on related diversification, in particular that 
work which has explored the decisions of IT software and hardware firms to diversify by 
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offering multiple products on the same platform or the same product on multiple platforms 
(Stern and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008; Cottrell and Nault, 2004). While 
much of the prior work in this area examines how the diversification strategy of these firms 
at a particular point in time influence performance, we focus on how the possession of key 
cospecialized complementary assets and learning that has taken place on home ecosystem 
influences the decision to affiliate with another platform. In this way, we follow earlier 
work that has emphasized how knowledge, resources, and capabilities accumulated in one 
product market can be extended into related product markets (Penrose, 1959; Helfat and 
Eisenhardt, 2004; Døving and Gooderham, 2008). In particular, our approach is informed 
by approaches that argue that firms can possess both core product knowledge and 
integrative knowledge that can facilitate coordination across production chains (Helfat and 
Raubitschek, 2000). While we similarly emphasize how knowledge of how to integrate in 
an inter-firm relationship can be applied in new contexts, we also highlight in particular 
the accumulation of knowledge at the intersection of three forms of human capital and the 
organizational competencies that arise from integrating knowledge across boundaries.  
Further, our research also has implications for the broader strategy literature. In 
particular, firm response to environmental change has been of interest to a wide range of 
scholars. While most of the prior focus has been on response to technological change 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997), response 
to demand side changes has been of interest to scholars more recently. Researchers in this 
stream have looked at both its theoretical implications (Adner and Levinthal, 2001) and 
tested them empirically in different settings such as the medical device (Chatterji and 
Fabrizio, 2012) and defense industries (Agarwal and Wu, 2015). We complement this prior 
 82 
work by studying the strategic role played by human capital in heterogeneous 
organizational response to demand side changes in the enterprise software industry.  
Our study has implications for managers thinking about sourcing and deploying 
talent. If the deployment of knowledge did not require coordination across workers, then 
firms could obtain the necessary skills to multihome by contracting for labor or acquiring 
them directly through the labor market. However, the necessary knowledge arises from 
repeated coordination among individuals belonging to the organization and, hence, 
becomes embedded in the organizing principles that govern coordination (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Internal organization not only solves the problem of motivation among 
individuals but brings about better communication efficiency (Williamson, 1975: P. 25). 
This becomes especially important when firms try to deal with uncertainty or respond to 
changes in the demand environment within a relatively short period of time  
“It can be a challenge especially for small companies … it is very hard to 
get product knowledge and process knowledge transferred to new 
employees” 
 
As illustrated by the above quote from an industry expert, bringing in new 
individuals from the market and getting them accustomed to a complex routine takes time. 
It makes it hard for firms to exploit the labor market to respond to rapid changes, forcing 
them to rely on redeployment of existing human capital. 
Our study also has some limitations. Given the nature of our data and the sources 
of variation that we observe, there may be competing factors at work that could influence 
our results. As we describe in further detail above, increases in partnership duration may 
also be correlated with internal team learning that leads to improvements in the ability of 
complementors to develop and market new software. Further, our results may also be 
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influenced by complementor investments that are specific to the existing platform. These 
factors are likely to work against our results and we provide some empirical tests to help 
circumscribe how they might influence our estimates. However, we are unable to quantify 
their effects.  
Firms make strategic decisions related to the nature of their human capital 
investments in response to a variety of internal and external factors. By focusing on pre-
sample human capital and using firm-level fixed effects, our research design controls for 
many potential sources of omitted variable bias that could influence both human capital 
decisions and multihoming. However, it is also similarly unable to speak to the reasons that 
firms choose a specific human capital profile. This is an important set of questions. We 
hope that our results will encourage further investigation into these questions, as well 
related inquiries into the causes and implications of human capital decisions by 
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3.8 Appendix  
3.8.1 Robustness Checks 
Table 3.6 Alternative Measure: Longer ATW - Five Years (2004-2008) 






Functional HC - 
Industry HC 
Interaction 
Technical HC - 
Industry HC 
Interaction 
          
Log Employees 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.422] [0.329] [0.250] [0.791] 
Log Sales -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 [0.066] [0.151] [0.089] [0.250] 
Specialist Firm X Longer ATW -0.047    
 (0.018)    
 [0.010]    
Longer ATW X Technical HC  -0.049  -0.041 
  (0.026)  (0.028) 
  [0.058]  [0.143] 
Longer ATW X Functional HC  -0.070 -0.074  
  (0.019) (0.019)  
  [0.000] [0.000]  
Longer ATW X Technical HC X 
Functional HC  0.052   
  (0.027)   
  [0.050]   
Longer ATW X Industry HC   -0.072 -0.063 
   (0.018) (0.017) 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
Longer ATW X Industry HC X 
Functional HC   0.075  
   (0.019)  
   [0.000]  
Longer ATW X Technical HC X 
Industry HC    0.043 
    (0.028) 
    [0.132] 
Constant -0.010 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
 [0.261] [0.119] [0.170] [0.207] 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412 1,412 
Number of Firms 226 226 226 226 
R-squared 0.064 0.075 0.082 0.071 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.618 0.622 0.625 0.621 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
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Longer ATW: Longer Acquisition time window (2004-2008). Estimates based on the linear probability model. 
Table 3.7 Alternative Measure: Shorter ATW - Two Years (2004-2005) 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Functional HC - 
Industry HC 
Interaction 
Technical HC - 
Industry HC 
Interaction 
          
Log Employees 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 [0.278] [0.197] [0.174] [0.355] 
Log Sales -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.092] [0.110] [0.092] [0.172] 
Specialist Firm X Shorter ATW -0.065    
 (0.026)    
 [0.014]    
Shorter ATW X Technical HC  -0.065  -0.054 
  (0.038)  (0.041) 
  [0.088]  [0.185] 
Shorter ATW X Functional HC  -0.098 -0.105  
  (0.027) (0.027)  
  [0.000] [0.000]  
Shorter ATW X Technical HC X 
Functional HC  0.069   
  (0.039)   
  [0.081]   
Shorter ATW X Industry HC   -0.101 -0.089 
   (0.026) (0.024) 
   [0.000] [0.000] 
Shorter ATW X Industry HC X 
Functional HC   0.104  
   (0.027)  
   [0.000]  
Shorter ATW X Technical HC X 
Industry HC    0.057 
    (0.042) 
    [0.170] 
Constant 0.019 0.011 0.014 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 [0.060] [0.328] [0.215] [0.172] 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 823 823 823 823 
Number of Firms 226 226 226 226 
R-squared 0.077 0.091 0.102 0.086 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.632 0.638 0.642 0.636 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
Shorter ATW: Shorter Acquisition time window (2004-2005). Estimates based on the linear probability model. 
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Table 3.8 Alternative Measure: Specialist Firm - 90th and 95th Percentile 
  (1) (2) 





      
Log Employees 0.003 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.643] [0.560] 
Log Sales -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.138] [0.136] 
Specialist Firm (90th) X ATW -0.039  
 (0.026)  
 [0.134]  
Specialist Firm (95th) X ATW  -0.055 
  (0.014) 
  [0.000] 
Constant 0.006 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
 [0.515] [0.574] 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Observations 1,020 1,020 
Number of Firms 226 226 
R-squared 0.062 0.061 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.614 0.614 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
ATW: Acquisition time window (2004-2006). Estimates based on the linear probability model. 
Specialist Firm (90th): Firms are specialists when they are above the 90th percentile on only one form of 
HC 
Specialist Firm (95th): Firms are specialists when they are above the 95th percentile on only one form of 
HC 
 
Here, we use the 90th and 95th percentiles of the human capital distribution to identify highly specialized 
firms, instead of the 75th percentile in our original measure, and repeat our analysis. We find that the initial 




Table 3.9 Alternative Measure: Partnership Duration – Longer and Shorter 
Partnerships 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Multihoming Duration 
Duration-Specialization 
Interaction 
      
Log Employees 0.003 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.660] [0.552] 
Log Sales -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.153] [0.069] 
Specialist Firm X ATW  0.035 
  (0.032) 
  [0.273] 
Partnership Duration X ATW 0.067 0.111 
 (0.023) (0.029) 
 [0.004] [0.000] 
Specialist Firm X Partnership Duration X 
ATW  -0.149 
  (0.044) 
  [0.001] 
Constant 0.020 0.028 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
 [0.019] [0.002] 
Firm FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Observations 1,020 1,020 
Number of Firms 226 226 
R-squared 0.076 0.105 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.620 0.632 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
ATW: Acquisition time window (2004-2006). Estimates based on the linear probability model. 
 
Here, we use as an alternative measure for partnership duration. Those firms that have partnered with SAP 
for five or more years at the start of the acquisition time window are said to be in a high-duration partnership 
while others are assumed to be in a low-duration partnership. We use a dummy variable to denote partnership 
duration that takes either of two values, high (1) or low (0). We find that our initial results based on H2 and 






3.8.2 Alternative Explanations 
Table 3.10 Alternative Explanation: Dot-com Bubble and Multihoming 
  (1) 
Dependent Variable: Multihoming  
    
Log Employees -0.016 
 (0.013) 
 [0.251] 
Log Sales -0.003 
 (0.003) 
 [0.455] 








Number of Firms 130 
R-squared 0.150 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.524 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
Dot-com Bubble: Year 2001 when firms pursued risky strategies. Specialized Firm: Based on the year 
1999. 




Table 3.11 Alternative Explanation: Internal versus External Learning 
  (1) (2) (3) 











       
Log Employees 0.001 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) 
 [0.824] [0.534] [0.623] 
Log Sales -0.002 -0.003 0.029 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.019) 
 [0.318] [0.138] [0.140] 
Age at Partnership X ATW 0.005 0.007 0.029 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) 
 [0.216] [0.124] [0.011] 
Specialist Firm X ATW  0.087 0.320 
  (0.048) (0.132) 
  [0.070] [0.018] 
Partnership Duration X ATW 0.008 0.016 0.035 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) 
 [0.073] [0.011] [0.034] 
Specialist Firm X ATW X Age at Partnership  -0.010 -0.027 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
  [0.057] [0.015] 
Specialist Firm X ATW X Partnership Duration  -0.021 -0.037 
  (0.007) (0.017) 
  [0.006] [0.033] 
Constant 0.006 0.011 -0.415 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.263) 
 [0.605] [0.321] [0.118] 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Observations 1,020 1,020 354 
Number of Firms 226 226 84 
R-squared 0.067 0.088 0.154 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.616 0.625 0.658 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets.  







Table 3.12 Alternative Explanation: Relationship-Specific and Co-specialized 
Investments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Multihoming Technical HC Functional HC Industry HC Three HCs 
          
Log Employees 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.669] [0.227] [0.442] [0.298] 
Log Sales -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.204] [0.077] [0.150] [0.126] 
Technical HC X ATW -0.048   -0.023 
 (0.022)   (0.022) 
 [0.027]   [0.290] 
Functional HC X ATW  -0.070  -0.058 
  (0.018)  (0.016) 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Industry HC X ATW   -0.067 -0.050 
   (0.017) (0.015) 
   [0.000] [0.001] 
Constant 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
 [0.754] [0.844] [0.746] [0.949] 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
Number of Firms 226 226 226 226 
R-squared 0.066 0.075 0.073 0.086 
R-squared (includes fixed effects) 0.616 0.619 0.618 0.624 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
ATW: Acquisition time window (2004-2006). Estimates based on the linear probability model. 
 
It may be seen that all the three different forms of HC namely technical HC, functional HC and Industry 
HC have a negative impact on multihoming when subject to the demand shock. 
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3.8.3 Alternative Specification 
Table 3.13 Alternative Specification: Survival Model – Cox 
  (1) (2) (3) 






        
Log Employees -0.059 -0.086 -0.091 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.111) 
 [0.582] [0.421] [0.412] 
Log Sales 0.015 0.016 0.023 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) 
 [0.704] [0.692] [0.570] 
Specialist Firm X ATW -0.689  2.124 
 (0.626)  (0.903) 
 [0.271]  [0.019] 
ATW X Partnership Duration  0.205 0.321 
  (0.081) (0.064) 
  [0.011] [0.000] 
Specialist Firm X ATW X Partnership Duration   -0.745 
   (0.292) 
   [0.011] 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 





































    
    
Coefficient Estimates; Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
ATW: Acquisition time window (2004-2006). Estimates based on the Cox survival model. 
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The table shows the results based on the Cox proportional hazard model and columns (1), (2) and (3) 
correspond to our hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 respectively. The marginal effects are elasticities (and 
denoted by ey/dx). 
3.8.4 Interpretation of Results 
      
MH 
Propensity 
Type of Complementor 
Generalist Specialist 
Time Period   
Before ATW 0.000 -0.003 
During ATW 0.068 0.012 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Specialization and Multihoming  
The figure helps interpret the results corresponding to Hypothesis 1 better. It shows the predicted probabilities 
of multihoming for specialist and generalist firms, before and during the ATW. We find that both specialist 
and generalist are more likely to multihome during the ATW when compared to the period before the ATW. 















Before ATW During ATW
Effect of being Specialist or Generalist on 







Short Term Long Term 
Time Period   
Before ATW 0.010 0.001 
During ATW 0.038 0.061 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Partnership Duration and Multihoming 
 
The figure helps interpret the results corresponding to Hypothesis 2 better. It shows the predicted probabilities 
of multihoming for firms with short term and long term partnerships, before and during the ATW. The median 
number of years of prior partnership is five years in our sample. We designate those partnerships that were 
for five or more years as long term and others as short term. We find that both types of firms are more likely 
to multihome during the ATW when compared to the period before the ATW. While the increase is negligible 













Before ATW During ATW
Effect of Partnership Duration on 




Specialist Complementors   
MH Propensity Partnership Duration 
Short Term Long Term 
Time Period   
Before ATW 0.015 -0.006 





Short Term Long Term 
Time Period   
Before ATW 0.009 0.002 
During ATW 0.036 0.086 
   
 
  
Figure 3.4 Partnership Duration and Multihoming – Specialist versus Generalist 
Firms 
The left panel in the figure corresponds to specialists among the complementors while the right panel 
corresponds to the generalists. During the ATW, generalists with long term prior partnership are the most 
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Before ATW During ATW
Generalists
Short Term Long Term
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3.8.5  Computation of Human Capital  
Technical HC, Functional HC, and Industry HC are related in the following way:  
 
Figure 3.5 Coordination among skills required to integrate a software solution into 
an ERP platform 
In order to determine the values of Technical HC, Functional HC and Industry HC for a 
given complementor in the year 2001, we proceed in the following manner. 
A typical CV in our sample would be similar to the one shown below for reference. 
 
Jessica Claire 
       190 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta GA 30303           +1-908-909-908      
Jessica.claire@mailbox.com 
SUMMARY 
SAP FICO consultant with over 20 years experience, working in multiple industries (Oil & Gas, 
Logistics, Engineering and Construction) in various capacities, primarily technology implementation and 
support. Led several full life-cycle projects with phased rollouts as well as short-term engagements and 















Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA                                                                         1996 
· B.S. in Engineering Major: Information Technology 
 
Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA                  2010 
· Masters in Business Administration Major: Information Technology Management Minor: Marketing 
 
JOB DESCRIPTION  
 Principal Consultant 
Radiant Technologies, Houston, TX                                                                               
(Sep 2012 - Present) 
- Oversee the development of SAP HANA Cloud based offerings aimed at SMBs offering 
engineering and construction services. 
- Analyzed the competitive landscape in the area of cloud based ERP and recommended a 
strategic roadmap for our products. 
- Developed customer use cases on successful digital transformation. 
 Lead Consultant 
Radiant Technologies, Houston, TX                                                                                
 (June 2008 – Sep 2012) 
- Led the roll out of SAP in 15 Countries as part of a transformational project for an Oil & 
Gas MNC. 
- Involved in the preparation of Business Requirement Document (BRD), Functional 
Design Document (FDD), Blueprinting, Configuration, Functional specs (FS). 
- Supported user acceptance testing, integration testing, and change management for 
implementation. 
- Headed the QA team and guided team members in delivering quality output. 
- Anchored PMO level meetings to monitor progress of the phased roll out across 
countries. 
 Senior Consultant 
Apriso, Atlanta, GA                                                                            
(Mar 1998 – June 2008) 
- Gathered business requirements from ERP end-users and developed and implemented 
SAP FICO based solutions to transform their IT landscape. 
- Co-responded to RFPs; documented as-is and to-be system landscape; and provided 
solution architecture. 
- Serviced clients across multiple verticals – Logistics, Engineering and Construction. 
 Software Development Engineer 
IBM, Atlanta, GA                                                                                
 (July 1996 – Feb 1998) 
- Involved in coding, testing, documentation and implementation of modules based on 




Human capital related words are mentioned on a person’s CV in two different sections 
namely the summary section and the skills section that pertains to each of the firms 
employed in. 
In our example, the text in the summary section is as below. 
SAP FICO consultant with over 20 years experience, working in multiple industries (Oil & Gas, 
Logistics, Engineering and Construction) in various capacities, primarily technology implementation and 
support. Led several full life-cycle projects with phased rollouts as well as short-term engagements and 
upgrades. Has also been responsible for instructor led train the trainer projects and post go-live support. 
The text in the job description section corresponding to Apriso is as below. 
- Gathered business requirements from ERP end-users and developed and implemented 
SAP FICO based solutions to transform their IT landscape. 
- Co-responded to RFPs; documented as-is and to-be system landscape; and provided 
solution architecture. 
- Serviced clients across multiple verticals – Logistics, Engineering and Construction. 
 
We first make a collection of words from the summary and remove all the stop words from 
the text. Please refer to Table A3.1 for a list of commonly occurring stop words that are 
filtered out before natural language processing. 
Next we count the number of words pertaining to the three different HC measures. Table 
A3.2 provides the list of keywords corresponding to the three types of HC. These words 
have been derived from a dictionary of terms pertaining to the ERP ecosystem available in 
the public domain. 
First, we look into the summary text for words corresponding to the functional HC measure 
from the dictionary of terms. In our example, the term SAP FICO is found and counts 
toward the functional HC measure.  
Second, we look for terms corresponding to the technical HC measure. We find that there 
are no terms in the summary that correspond to the technical HC measure. 
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Third, we look for industry specific terms and find five terms in the summary namely oil, 
gas, logistics, engineering and construction that correspond to verticals that count toward 
our industry HC measure. 
Next we divide the three counts by the number of words in the summary to control for the 
length of the summary. 
Functional HC count = 1 
Technical HC count = 0 
Industry HC count = 5 
Total number of words in summary = 57 
Number of words after removing stop words = 43 
After dividing by the number of words, we get the following measures for this 
particular employee. 
Functional HC corresponding to the summary section is given as 
Functional_HC_Summary_Section = 1/43 = 0.023 
Similarly, Technical HC and Industry HC are found to be 
Technical_HC_Summary_Section = 0/43 = 0 
Industry_HC_Summary_Section = 5/43 = 0.116 
Please note that the summary section is common across jobs. So, we allocate only the 
fraction of the skills corresponding the five years prior to 2001. 
The functional HC from the summary section corresponding to the complementor (Apriso) 
in the year 2001 contributed by this employee is given as 
Functional_HC_Summary_Section_Apriso_2001 = 5/20*0.023 = 0.006 
In a similar manner, we have, 
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Technical_HC_Summary_Section_Apriso_2001 = 5/20*0 = 0 
Industry_HC_Summary_Section_Apriso_2001 = 5/20*0.116 = 0.029 
Now, we repeat the same procedure for the job description section and obtain the counts as 
below. 
Functional HC count = 1  
Technical HC count = 0 
Industry HC count = 3 
Total number of words in the job description section pertaining to Apriso = 45 
Number of words after removing stop words = 36 
By dividing by the number of words, we get the following measures 
Functional_HC_Job_Desription_Section = 1/36 = 0.028 
Technical_HC_ Job_Desription _Section = 0/36 = 0 
Industry_HC_ Job_Desription _Section = 3/36 = 0.083 
Please note that the job description section is common across all the years spent on the job. 
So, we allocate only the fraction of the skills corresponding to the five years prior to 2001. 
Also, note that some employees sometimes give the exact month of transition from one job 
to another as in our example here but others choose to provide only the year. To keep things 
uniform, we allocate 0.5 years each to the two companies whenever an employee switches 
between them. 
Total years spent by the employee in Apriso = 0.5 (corresponding to the year 1998) + 9 
(corresponding to the years 1999-2007) + 0.5 (corresponding to the year 2008) = 10 
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Among these years, the relevant number of years when computing the employee’s HC at 
Apriso in 2001 is 3.5 given by adding 0.5 (corresponding to the year 1998) and 3 
(corresponding to the years 1999-2001). 
So, we have  
Functional_HC_Job_Desription_Section_Apriso_2001 = 3.5/10 * 0.028 = 0.01 
Technical_HC_ Job_Desription _Section_Apriso_2001 = 3.5/10 * 0 = 0 
Industry_HC_ Job_Desription _Section_Apriso_2001 = 3.5/10 * 0.083 = 0.029 
Combining the two, the three HC values for Apriso in the year 2001 contributed by the 
given employee are given as 
Functional_HC _Apriso_2001 = 0.006 + 0.01 = 0.016 
Technical_HC_Apriso_2001 = 0 + 0 = 0 
Industry_HC _Apriso_2001 = 0.029 + 0.029 = 0.058 
We repeat the above procedure for all the employees in the sample that are employed with 
Apriso in 2001. 
The total values corresponding to the three forms of HC are thus obtained as,  
Total_Functional_HC _Apriso_2001 = 0.0365 
Total_Technical_HC_Apriso_2001 = 0.767 
Total_ Industry_HC _Apriso_2001 = 0.146 
We finally bring the three forms of HC to the per employee level by dividing the number 
of employees in the sample. 
Number of employees in the sample = 36.5 (Note that the number is fractional because of 
transition of employees during the year) 
Functional_HC _per_employee_Apriso_2001 = 0.0365/36.5 = 0.001 
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Technical_per_employee _HC_Apriso_2001 = 0.767/36.5 = 0.021 
Industry_per_employee _HC _Apriso_2001 = 0.146/36.5 = 0.004 
It may be noted here that we actually use logged values of these measures to account for 
the skewness of the overall distribution of three HCs across firms. The steps followed in 























Table 3.14 List of Stop Words 
a don't in she'd wasn't 
about down into she'll we 
above during is she's we'd 
after each isn't should we'll 
again few it shouldn't we're 
against for it's so we've 
all from its some were 
am further itself such weren't 
an had let's than what 
and hadn't me that what's 
any has more that's when 
are hasn't most the when's 
aren't have mustn't their where 
as haven't my theirs where's 
at having myself them which 
be he no themselves while 
because he'd nor then who 
been he'll not there who's 
before he's of there's whom 
being her off these why 
below here on they why's 
between here's once they'd with 
both hers only they'll won't 
but herself or they're would 
by him other they've wouldn't 
can't himself ought this you 
cannot his our those you'd 
could how ours  through you'll 
couldn't how's ourselves to you're 
did i out too you've 
didn't i'd over under your 
do i'll own until yours 
does i'm same up yourself 
doesn't i've shan't very yourselves 




Table 3.15 List of Keywords 
  
Technical HC Industry HC Functional HC 
ABAP Aerospace  SAP FICO 
Netweaver Defense SAP MM 
SAP BASIS Automotive SAP SD 
Java Banking SAP PP 
Javascript Chemicals SAP BI 
HTML Consumer Products SAP SRM 
SQL Engineering SAP CRM 
Database Construction SAP HCM 
Code Operations SAP BW 
Coding Healthcare SAP FI 
Programming Higher Education SAP PS 
Technical Research SAP PM 
Architecture High Tech Financial Accounting 
C Industrial Machinery  Materials Management 
C++ Insurance Sales and Distribution 
Websphere Life Sciences Production Planning 
J2EE Media Business Intelligence 
  Mill Products Supplier Relationship Management 
  Mining Customer Relationship Management 
  Oil  Human Capital Management 
  Gas Business Warehouse 
  Professional Services Project System 
  Public Sector Plant Maintenance 
  Retail Functional 
  Sports   
  Entertainment   
  Telecommunications   
  Transportation   
  Logistics   
  Utilities   







CHAPTER 4. PLATFORM COMPETITION AND 
COMPLEMENTOR PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Platform based ecosystems are driving innovation and transforming several 
industries such as e-commerce, urban mobility, hospitality, communication and so on 
(Evans, Hagiu and Schmalensee, 2006). This has consequences for both the nature of value 
creation and value appropriation with those industries (Teece, 2007). Ecosystems involve 
various types of dependencies and complementarities that determine the value-add of the 
overall ecosystem (Jacobides, Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018). An open set of questions 
within this literature is whether and how complementors benefit from competition among 
platform owners.  
On the one side, a logic based entirely on cross-side network effects, which has 
dominated our thinking on two-sided markets, would suggest that growth of a rival 
platform’s installed base would hurt complementors of the focal platform.  On the other, 
the dynamics of value creation and value capture within ecosystems would suggest that 
platform owners would be more willing to share value with complementors when faced 
with competition from rivals to dissuade them from joining the rival platform. This has 
implications not only for the complementors but also for the ‘tipping’ of the overall market 
toward a dominant platform, leading to a winner-takes all (WTA) (Shapiro and Varian, 
1998; Parker, Van Alstyne, and Choudary, 2016; Bresnahan, Orsini, and Yin, 2014). 
The literature on two-sided markets has stressed the role of demand-side economies 
of scale and the existence of cross-side network effects (Shankar and Bayus, 2003, 
Clements and Ohashi, 2005), which has been seen as central to achieving WTA. However, 
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the pursuit of WTA approaches has been shown to be not always beneficial, resulting at 
times in lowering of platform performance (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013). We complement 
this study and show that the performance of complementors affiliated to a platform could 
still improve when the rival platform increases its installed base. We reason that this could 
arise from ‘steering’ – activities pursued by the incumbent platform to encourage 
complementor sales, share the value created, and potentially discourage them from 
multihoming into the rival platform (Rochet and Tirole, 2003).  Further, we argue that the 
resultant positive effect on performance varies across complementors and depends, in 
particular, on their heterogeneous ability to internalize the value created based on the scope 
of their human capital. Rietveld and Eggers (2018) show that demand-side heterogeneity 
in terms of early and late platform adopters affect complementor sales. Here, we argue that 
the difference could also arise from supply-side factors particularly in terms of 
heterogeneity in complementor skills. Finally, we posit that, in spite of the potential for 
steering by the incumbent platform, complementors that still go on to multihome would 
tend to benefit from potential access to the combined installed base of the rival platforms.  
Research within platform ecosystems has been more concerned with platform owner 
strategies (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) and has dealt with questions on openness of innovation 
(Boudreau, 2010), standard setting (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008), ecosystem regulation and 
governance (Tiwana et. al., 2010). Less attention has been paid toward the role of 
complementors within these ecosystems (Ceccagnoli et. al., 2012; Kapoor and Agarwal, 
2017). However, rapid advances in ICT in recent years have enabled numerous 
complementors to join the platform owner in value co-creation. Successful businesses are 
increasingly relying on the external developer ecosystem to generate value (Parker, Van 
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Alstyne, and Jiang, 2017).  Hence, it becomes important for researchers to study 
complementors in order to better understand their capabilities and strategies.  
The sustainability of superior performance is determined by environmental factors 
such as structure and change that are common across firms as well as the unique capabilities 
and purposeful action of individual firms operating within that environment. For example, 
Kapoor and Agarwal (2017) deals with the former and uses ecosystem complexity 
(structure) and generational transitions (change) to characterize the platform ecosystem 
environment. In this paper, we look at how a complementor’s capabilities in terms of its 
human capital and its decision to partner with multiple platforms (henceforth referred to as 
multihoming) affect its performance when there is a change in the platform ecosystem 
environment. We build a theory based on three inter-related elements namely the strategic 
value of the firm’s own human capital, the role played by complementor’s decision to 
multihome, and the shift in competition among platform owners, to explain differential 
complementor performance. 
We use the ERP platform ecosystem setting to test our assertions. We use a sample 
of SAP complementors and supplement firm level data on sales, employees, partnership 
duration and multihoming strategy with novel micro-level data on human capital extracted 
from employee CV’s and aggregated to the firm level. Our findings may be summarized 
as follows. First, we find that, on average, an increase in platform level competition 
benefits complementors. Second, specialist complementors benefit less than generalist 
complementors from this change in competition. Third, complementors that multihome 
tend to perform better than others in periods of increased competition among platform 
owners. We performed a number of checks to ensure the robustness of these results to 
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alternative specifications and variable definitions. While it is difficult to disentangle the 
effect of human capital specialization and multihoming from other complementor 
characteristics, we try to show that our results are robust to the inclusion of interactions of 
platform level competition market with duration of partnership with the incumbent 
platform and age of the complementor prior to partnership 
The paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on platform ecosystems 
as well as the broader strategy literature. First, this is one of the few empirical studies that 
looks at the impact of platform competition on complementor performance.  While prior 
literature has looked at platform owner strategies or the impact of platform owners’ 
strategies on rival platforms (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013), our paper brings the focus to 
the complementor’s performance. In this way, it joins a stream of literature that has tried 
to understand the drivers of complementor competitive advantage in the form of 
intellectual property and downstream capabilities (Huang et. al, 2012), technology change 
(Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017) and demand-side heterogeneity (Rietveld and Eggers, 2018). 
Second, it draws on a rich theoretical literature that has focused on demand side drivers of 
platform ecosystems (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Armstrong, 
2006) and combines this with supply side perspectives in the form of complementor 
capabilities and the complexity of integration with the platform. Third, the traditional 
strategy literature has emphasized the role of the firm’s investment in its own resources 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and capabilities (Teece et. al., 1997) in attaining and 
sustaining competitive advantage. Recently, the strategic role played by a firm’s human 
capital in sustainable competitive advantage has been emphasized (Barney and Felin, 
2013). In our paper, we aggregate micro-level human capital data to the firm level and 
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designate firms as specialists (and generalists). In particular, we try to answer how 
generalist and specialist firms that differ in terms of their scope of human capital are 
affected differently by changes in their environment.  
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Average Effect of Platform Competition  
The modular nature of platform ecosystems (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) enables 
value co-creation by platform owners and the numerous complementors that partner with 
them. But there is uncertainty over the extent to which platform owners are willing to share 
this co-created value with the complementors (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). This leads to 
co-opetition between platform owners and complementors. On the one hand, platform 
owners need to cooperate with complementors by opening up their platform and sharing 
knowledge with them to enable them contribute toward value creation. On the other, 
platform owners need to compete with complementors in negotiating and appropriating the 
overall value created in the ecosystem.  
When there is less platform level competition, platform owners may try to ‘squeeze’ 
value from complementors. Also, they may be less interested in promoting complementor 
solutions and more focused on selling their own core product. In some situations, platform 
owners may even try to enter directly into complementor markets in order to be able to 
appropriate more value from the ecosystem (Eisenmann and Parker, 2011). However, when 
faced with competition, platform owners would be more willing to promote complementor 
solutions in order to attract customers to their platform. Also, they would be more willing 
to share the value that is created in the ecosystem. In situations where platforms owners 
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charge a transaction fee, they may lower the fee charged to one side of the platform (Parker 
and Van Alstyne, 2005). But, in modular software platforms, this may take other 
sophisticated forms such as additional support for software development23; better interface 
to the platform’s underlying architecture; and promotion of complementor solutions to end 
customers. These are aimed at easing the effort of complementors and influencing them to 
pay less attention to rival platform owners. In the case of enterprise software, for example, 
SAP introduced the SAP Community Network in 2004 to enable interaction among SAP 
customers and complementors in the SAP ecosystem. It also made available a community 
of SAP experts on the network to connect and collaborate with. Over the years, the 
community evolved into a repository of technical, functional and business knowledge 
related to the development, deployment and integration of enterprise software. SAP also 
released the NetWeaver technology platform in 2004 that had been announced back in 
2003. The aim of the platform was to reduce complexity and the costs of integrating with 
the platform. This was aimed at boosting the market share of the SAP platform through 
adoption of the technology by complementors and, in turn, the customers. In response to 
the growing demand for information on SAP NetWeaver, SAP launched a 50-city 
worldwide tour that took place throughout 2004 and used the interactions to explain more 
about the ease of integration achievable through Netweaver to complementors and 
customers. This reiterates the notion that successful firms are often better at orchestrating 
their ecosystem rather than trying to do everything themselves (Gawer and Cusumano, 
                                                 
23 SAP started the SAP Developer Network (subsequently called the SAP Community Network) within 
weeks of Oracle’s initial announcement to acquire PeopleSoft back in 2003. SAP assured the community 
that it would bring in its experts to engage with the ecosystem and resolve queries of its members. The 
subsequent enthusiastic participation in the ecosystem is captured in the form of queries raised over time 
(shown in the appendix). 
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2002). In summary, we should find the average effect of platform competition on 
complementor performance to be positive. 
H1: Increased platform competition has a positive effect on complementor performance. 
4.2.2 Generalist versus Specialists 
Even though platform competition is beneficial to complementors on average, 
generalists would tend to benefit more than specialists. Software development not only 
requires technical skills, which has often been discussed in the literature, but also domain 
knowledge (Chatterjee, 2017). We unpack domain knowledge further into functional skills 
that captures the functionalities of the platform and the application that complementors 
provide and industry skills that pertain to the specific industry for which the application is 
built. The presence of all three skills within the firm makes it easier to develop and 
implement applications for customers in the ecosystem.  While modularity brings down 
the need for technical interdependencies, functional and other interdependencies remain 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000). The idea that organizational ties mirror the underlying 
technical dependencies alone does not hold in software development in open collaborative 
environments (Colfer and Baldwin, 2016). This requires such firms to often draw their 
knowledge boundaries broader than their immediate operational boundaries.  The co-
specialized nature of these skills also makes it harder to contract on the individual skills in 
the ecosystem. It becomes especially harder in a dynamic and hyper-competitive 
environment. Since, generalists are less dependent on the broader ecosystem for resource 
deployment, they have the dynamic capabilities to react to the change in their environment 
(Teece et. al., 1997). On the other hand, specialists are less capable of reacting to changes 
in demand and appropriating value from the ecosystem. Generalists may be thought of as 
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possessing better integrative capabilities i.e. the ability to integrate knowledge across 
different human capital dimensions through effective communication and coordination 
(Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018). While it may make sense to specialize and lower the 
coordination costs across human capital, certain firms may be more willing to invest in 
diverse forms of human capital and remain as generalists in order to be able to better react 
to changes in the environment. Further, the tendency to remain as generalists may be 
particularly more pronounced in ecosystems that are built on system technologies 
characterized by complementarities (Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2016). While we 
acknowledge the possibility that some of the skills could be brought in from outside, 
internal governance not only solves the problem of private incentives but also brings also 
results in efficient communication. This makes it better than a market form of governance 
for skills, which can be thought of as a second-best form of contracting. To sum up our 
arguments, even if additional value gets created within the ecosystem, specialists are at a 
disadvantageous position in negotiating over that value (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart 
and Moore, 1990). 
Hence, we would expect the following. 
H2: When platform competition increases, the performance of generalist complementors 
increases more than that of specialist complementors. 
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Setting 
We use the ERP platform ecosystem setting to test our hypotheses. The global 
enterprise software market is expected to reach $575 billion by 2024.24 The US continues 
to remain the largest market for enterprise software. The digital economy, of which 
enterprise software is a crucial component, has been growing at 4.3 times the broader US 
economy over the last 20 years (1997-2017)25. Oracle and SAP are the leading platform 
owners who control a significant portion of the ERP platform ecosystem. In this way, they 
are comparable to iOS and Android in the mobile ecosystem. Also, just as Android has 
been trying to catch with iOS across markets in recent years, in the case of the ERP system, 
SAP may be seen as the incumbent back in the early 2000’s and Oracle as the new entrant 
trying to improve its market share and catch up with SAP.  
Different forms of enterprise software such as those employed in inventory control, 
warehouse management etc. have been around for decades. However, the notion of an ERP 
ecosystem began when SAP transitioned from mainframes to a client-server architecture 
in the mid 1990’s. The new architecture enabled complementors to build applications on 
the SAP platform and add value to the core product. This is again somewhat similar to the 
case of the mobile ecosystem where transition from feature phones to smartphones 
suddenly enabled numerous complementors to develop apps on the mobile platform. 
                                                 
24 As per Global Forecast reports from ResearchandMarkets.com. 
25 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
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The mid 2000’s marked the most interesting phase of competition within this 
ecosystem. Oracle, the other major platform owner within this ecosystem decided to 
acquire many of the other ERP platforms in order to strengthen its own capabilities and to 
give a tough competition to the then market leader SAP. Even though SAP continued to 
hold on to its leadership position, the relative market share of Oracle improved 
substantially over this period and it emerged as a very close second. 
Oracle brought in a top executive with expertise in investment banking and, 
beginning in 2004, embarked on a series of acquisitions worth several billion dollars to 
boost its market share on the customer side and signal its commitment to complementors 
on the other side. Its first major acquisition was that of PeopleSoft, a leader in human 
capital management software, which had itself acquired JD Edwards, another major legacy 
ERP vendor, only a year before. Oracle’s offer to PeopleSoft which was in excess of $10 
billion was then the highest for any acquisition within the IT industry. Other notable 
acquisitions that followed include iFlex, a banking solution provider, in 2005; Siebel, 
which had expertise in Customer Relationship Management segment of ERP, in early 2006 
and; BEA systems, which had expertise in enterprise applications as well as middleware, 
in 2008. Oracle was so successful in making so many acquisitions and making inroads into 
all the different industries and functional segments within ERP that SAP, which made just 
two acquisitions during the same period, was forced to rethink its own strategy or growing 





The dataset has been built from several secondary data sources. The data covers the 
2001-2006 period which saw a lot of competition between SAP and Oracle to dominate the 
market. The evolution of competition between the two leading platform owners in the 
market makes it an ideal time period to test the impact of platform level competition on 
complementor performance. 
Our sample is composed of US based SAP complementors.  The decision to limit 
our sample to US based complementors is to ensure considerable homogeneity across the 
sample. We first identified SAP partners from the SAP website dedicated to ecosystem 
partners. Even though SAP provides accurate information on all its complementors on this 
website, limiting the sample to these partners alone would lead to a survivorship bias. Also, 
as stated earlier, we are interested in those complementors that were active in the early and 
mid-2000s and for whom multihoming was indeed a strategic choice. Hence, we decided 
to expand the list of complementors by making use of data from SAP’s annual meetings. 
SAP’s annual meetings are aimed at connecting with both sides of the market namely the 
complementors and the end-customers. Complementors sign up as exhibitors to showcase 
their products and settings during these meetings. We searched for the list of such 
exhibitors on the internet archives of various SAP meeting related web pages and obtained 
the complete list of exhibitors for the years 1996-2009 for SAP SAPPHIRE and 2000-2006 
for SAP Insider. 
In order to get the year of partnership formation with SAP and Oracle, we relied on 
press releases from Factiva. After comparing the press releases obtained from Factiva with 
those from other sources such as Lexis Nexis, we found Factiva to be much better and 
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decided to continue with it for the rest of the sample. In order to determine firm 
specialization in human capital, we required micro-level human capital data from the time. 
We had to extract this data from LinkedIn that provides information on both present and 
past employees of complementors in our sample. We would like to note here that this 
method is novel within the strategy literature even though CVs have sometimes been used 
to study start-up founders and top management teams within other literature streams.  
Finally, we matched our sample with proprietary data from the National 
Establishment Time Series (NETS) database, which is actually a time series of the yearly 
Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) database. We were able to obtain the complementors’ sales 
(dollar revenues) and size (employee count) data for the years 1990 to 2013 based on this 
approach. We also limit our sample to relatively small complementor firms. This is for two 
reasons. One, large complementors may possess several additional upstream and 
downstream capabilities that could influence their bargaining power relative to the platform 
owner. Second, there is a possibility that some large complementors may have been kept 
in confidence by Oracle while going in for some of the acquisitions. The observation unit 
used for analysis is firm-year. Our panel consists of 235 firms sampled during the 2001-
2006 period and is unbalanced by construction since firms enter the partnerships at 
different points of time.  
4.3.3 Dependent Variable 
4.3.3.1 Log Sales 
Log transformation of sales revenues (in dollars) of the complementor as of a given 
year. In order to measure the sustained effect on performance, we also use lead values of 
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the dependent variable. First, it could be that the effect is more pronounced in some years 
than others. In our case, it may be reasonable to expect complementors to take time to react 
to the steering activities pursued by SAP. Second, it may be noted that it is quite common 
to use lagged values of independent variables in other settings for similar purposes. Here, 
we use the lead values of the dependent variable, instead, in accordance with our theory 
that SAP reacts with steering to the initial announcement of acquisitions by Oracle, which 
take up to two years to reflect as actual license revenues. Third, the use of lead values also 
enables us to avoid the possibility of simultaneity between changes in some of our 
dependent variables and the observed growth in sales.  Fourth, single year changes may 
represent an idiosyncratic change in performance that may not have much to do with the 
change in platform competition.  Hence, to better understand the effect of platform 
competition, we show the effect with one-year and two-year leads alongside the baseline 
values. We use the corresponding values for our controls as well in our regressions. 
4.3.4 Independent Variables 
4.3.4.1 Oracle Market Share 
Our key independent variable is platform competition measured as the market share 
of Oracle relative to the incumbent platform SAP. We define it as the ratio of Oracle’s 
License Revenue to the sum of the License Revenue of Oracle and SAP in the enterprise 
software market in the US.26 While limiting the license revenue of Oracle to applications 
enables us to get a more accurate proxy for competition with SAP, it is hard to rule out the 
spillover effects of Oracle’s database capabilities on dominance in the ERP market. The 
                                                 
26 The License Revenues (in $ million) of SAP and Oracle as published in their annual reports are shown in 
the appendix.  
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relatively high proportion of SAP ERP installations with Oracle databases makes us believe 
that this is less of a concern. It may be noted that there is a gap between the date of 
announcement of merger and actual book merger of license revenues. To account for this, 
we bring all the license revenues back by two years to match with the time of 
announcement. This is consistent with our observation that SAP reacts to the 
announcement made by Oracle regarding its acquisition rather than wait until the book 
merger of license revenues.27  
Relative market share has often been used as a proxy for competition (Hansen and 
Wernerfelt, 1989). Further, in the case of two-sided platform based ecosystems with cross-
side network effects such as enterprise software in our case and others such as video games, 
PCs and mobiles, installed base of the hardware, the operating system, or the core software 
application have been used to proxy for the size of the network on one side that represents 
the potential size of demand for the other. 
It may be noted that the relative market share of Oracle varies only over time and 
remains common across complementors. Technological factors such as architectural 
complexity could have an impact on the attractiveness of Oracle and SAP as ERP platforms 
and may not be accounted for even after we control for other factors that vary over time. 
Instead of license revenues, we use the Acquisition Time Window (ATW) as an alternative 
measure to capture the effect of the investment commitment from the platform owner 
(Oracle). The time window is defined as a dichotomous variable that starts with zero and 
                                                 
27 Readers may refer to the appendix for more information on the actual sequence of events. 
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turns one during the time window (2004-2006) when Oracle made the stream of 
acquisitions. 
4.3.4.2 Specialist Firm 
Complementors that are above the 75th percentile on any one form of human capital 
but below this level on the other forms of human capital are referred to as specialist firms. 
We identify three different forms of human capital - Technical, Functional and Industry 
relevant to our setting. We describe the three human capital forms below. 
4.3.4.3 Technical Human Capital 
Measured as the log transformation of the aggregate technical skills possessed by 
complementor employees as of the year 2001, the starting year of our sample. Technical 
human capital is needed by the firm to develop an understanding of the technical 
architecture of a platform. The architecture of platforms can be quite complex (Kapoor and 
Agarwal, 2017) and hence the complementors may require technical consultants who 
demonstrate an understanding of the platform architecture as well as possess the ability to 
develop code that interacts with various built-in modules of the platform that are based on 
that architecture. 
4.3.4.4 Functional Human Capital 
Measured as the log transformation of the aggregate functional skills possessed by 
complementor employees as of the year 2001. ERP platform is aimed at automating the 
business process flows within and across companies. Hence, complementors that choose 
to develop products on an ERP platform need to have substantial understanding on the 
actual implementation of those flows within the ERP platform. Order-to-Cash is a typical 
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example of a business process flow within an ERP ecosystem. It refers to the various steps 
involved in the ordering of a product or service and the collection of cash from the customer 
for it by the end user of the ERP solution. An end-to-end business process may involve 
several steps and may be carried out by individuals spread within/ across organizations. 
Further, the process often cuts across the modular boundaries within the ERP platform as 
well as encompasses solutions built by complementors. A functional consultant is expected 
to have an understanding of the flow involved in the implementation of a particular 
business process say order-to-cash on the ERP platform.  
4.3.4.5 Industry Human Capital 
Measured as the log transformation of the aggregate industry skills possessed by 
complementor employees as of the year 2001. Knowledge work often requires individuals 
to know, to some extent, the industry context in which their solutions are being 
implemented (Mayer, Somaya and Williamson, 2012; Chatterjee, 2017). Domain/ Industry 
consultants usually have prior experience in a certain industry or develop expertise in a 
given industry by working on multiple projects specific to that industry. 
4.3.4.6 Multihoming 
Multihoming has been treated as a dichotomous variable that takes either zero or 
one as its value. When a complementor enters into a partnership with SAP28, the propensity 
is initialized to zero. Once the complementor enters into a partnership with Oracle, the 
value is changed to one and stays at one till the end of the sampling period. If the firm 
                                                 
28 Note that our focus in this study is on complementors affiliated with the incumbent platform. The 
assumption made is that there are only a limited number of complementors affiliated with the entrant 
platform to start with. 
 126 
never multihomes, the variable continues to remain at zero till the end of the sampling 
period. 
4.3.5 Control Variables 
4.3.5.1 Log Employees 
Log transformation of number of employees of the complementor as of a given 
year. We use this variable as a proxy for firm size and use it as a control in our regressions.  
In addition to firm level control for size, to capture industry level changes that could impact 
individual firm sales, we use two different control variables as defined below. 
4.3.5.2 Industry Establishments 
Total number of establishments in the SIC industry in a given year. This is the 
average value for a given year based on the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW). 
4.3.5.3 Industry Employment 
Total employment in the SIC industry in a given year. Again, this is the average 
value obtained from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). 
4.3.6 Other Variables 
We introduce certain other variables in our regressions to rule out potential 
alternative explanations for our results, which we discuss in detail later. They are defined 
here as below. 
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4.3.6.1 Partnership Duration 
The partnership duration is measured based on the prior SAP partnership of the 
complementors in our setting. It is measured as the total duration of the complementor’s 
partnership with SAP prior to the shock. 
4.3.6.2 Age at Partnership 
Firm age is captured as at the beginning of partnership with SAP. This definition 
enables us to separate the experience gained by the complementor through its partnership 
with SAP from prior internal experience of the complementor.   
4.3.7 Estimation 
We use a fixed effects panel data model to carry out the estimation. The fixed effects 
model helps us to control for time-invariant factors such as the innovative ability of the 
complementor and the type of partnership with the platform owner that are unobservable 
to the researcher. Our key independent variable, Oracle Market Share, varies only over 
time. Specialist Firm is defined as of the start of the sample and is fixed over time for any 
given firm. However, it is possible to estimate its interaction with platform competition in 
a fixed effects model.  
4.4 Results 
The basic summary statistics are shown in Table 4.1 while the correlations are 
reported in Table 4.2. Note that all the variables have been log transformed. This is to take 
care of the skewed nature of the distribution of the variables. The average share of Oracle 
in the combined license revenues of SAP and Oracle is 0.344 during the period. The relative 
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share varies by as much as 17.5 percentage points between a low of 0.260 and a high of 
0.435. It may be seen that around one-third of the complementors are specialized in terms 
of human capital. Multihoming, in general is quite low. In any given year, less than 3% of 
the firms are likely to multihome. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
(1) Log Sales Log Transformation of Sales Revenues 9.871 7.604 0 24.23 
(2) Log 
Employees 
Log Transformation of Number of 
Employees 




Dichotomous variable that equals 1 
during the acquisition time window 
(2004-06) and stays 0 otherwise 
0.596 0.491 0 1 
(4) Oracle 
Market Share 
Relative Market Share of Oracle with 
respect to SAP based on License 
Revenues 
0.344 0.063 0.260 0.435 
(5) Specialist 
Firm 
Firms above the 75th percentile on only 
one of the three forms of Human Capital 
namely Technical, Functional or 
Industry 
0.306 0.461 0 1 
(6) Technical 
HC 
Firms above the 75th percentile on  
Technical HC 
0.234 0.423 0 1 
(7) Industry HC Firms above the 75th percentile on  
Industry HC 
0.235 0.424 0 1 
(8) Functional 
HC 
Firms above the 75th percentile on  
Functional HC 
0.248 0.432 0 1 
(9) Multihoming Dichotomous variable that equals 1 
when the firm multihomes and stays 0 
otherwise 
0.143 0.350 0 1 
(10) Partnership 
Duration 
Duration of Partnership with SAP 
(difference between the year 2004 and 
the start of partnership) 
4.848 2.428 0 10 
(11) Age at 
Partnership 
Firm age at the beginning of partnership 
with SAP 




Number of establishments in the SIC 
industry in a given year (in thousands) 
53.37 23.08 11 82.81 
(13) Industry 
Employment 
Total Employment in the SIC industry 
in a given year (in thousands) 
455.2 154.9 105.8 796.5 
Number of Firms: 233; Number of Observations: 1155 
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Table 4.2 Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) 1             
(2) 0.859* 1            
(3) 0.091* 0.068* 1           
(4) 0.088* 0.059* 0.879* 1          
(5) -0.069* -0.055 0.004 0.008 1         
(6) -0.089* -0.114* 0.017 0.013 0.094* 1        
(7) -0.067* -0.014 0.011 0.005 0.115* 0.259* 1       
(8) -0.062* -0.015 -0.03 -0.026 0.232* 0.157* 0.137* 1      
(9) -0.026 -0.032 0.039 0.042 0.034 -0.138* -0.121* -0.028 1     
(10) 0.085* 0.109* -0.285* -0.241* 0.011 -0.139* -0.098* 0.094* 0.33* 1    
(11) 0.596* 0.443* 0.044 0.037 -0.145* -0.075* -0.083* -0.125* 0.024 -0.188* 1   
(12) 0.103* 0.023 0.132* 0.226* -0.127* 0.001 0.046 -0.086* -0.081* -0.056 0.077* 1  
(13) 0.178* 0.081* 0.127* 0.263* -0.159* 0.023 0.043 -0.103* -0.107* -0.043 0.134* 0.921* 1 
* p-value <0.05  
 
 
Table 4.3 shows the average effect of the change in market share of Oracle on sales. 
We find that when platform competition increases, it benefits the SAP complementors. To 
put this in perspective, a 4.98 percentage point increase in Oracle Market Share (which is 
the actual difference in the relative share between the years 2005 and 2006) leads to a 14.46 
percentage point change in the sales of the complementor. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to 
1-year and 2-year lead values of sales with corresponding controls. We find that the effect 
of platform competition persists across these lead values. Also, the economic significance 
of the effect on sales increases with time, reflecting the increase in response of 
complementors to actions taken by the incumbent platform over time. 
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Table 4.3 H1: Platform Competition and Complementor Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) 





        
Oracle Market Share 2.713** 3.789*** 4.443*** 
 (2.493) (3.509) (3.595) 
Log Employees 2.710***   
 (16.320)   
Industry Establishments 0.000   
 (0.039)   
Industry Employment -0.000   
 (-0.219)   
Log Employees (1-year Lead)  2.662***  
  (16.333)  
Industry Establishments (1-year Lead)  0.000  
  (0.060)  
Industry Employment (1-year Lead)  -0.000  
  (-0.024)  
Log Employees (2-year Lead)   2.550*** 
   (10.137) 
Industry Establishments (2-year Lead)   0.000 
   (0.306) 
Industry Employment (2-year Lead)   -0.000 
   (-0.219) 
Constant 2.410*** 2.080*** 2.283*** 
 (5.015) (3.379) (2.825) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared (with Fixed Effects) 0.969 0.962 0.953 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared within 0.768 0.713 0.588 
R-squared between 0.730 0.728 0.730 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
We show the differential effect of platform competition on complementor 
performance in Table 4.4. In line with our expectations, even though the average impact is 
positive, we find that generalists perform better than specialists when subject to the change 
in platform competition owing to the acquisitions. This reflects the dynamic and integrative 
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capabilities of generalists that enables them to respond better to changes in the environment 
and to internalize the benefits of steering through higher sales. 
Table 4.4 H2: Specialists and Generalists 
  (1) (2) (3) 







        
Oracle Market Share 3.983*** 5.595*** 6.052*** 
 (2.867) (4.049) (3.848) 
Specialist Firm X Oracle Market Share -4.133* -6.174** -5.447* 
 (-1.820) (-2.275) (-1.846) 
Log Employees 2.709***   
 (16.36)   
Industry Establishments 0.000149   
 (0.00930)   
Industry Employment -0.000462   
 (-0.209)   
Log Employees (1-year Lead)  2.670***  
  (16.70)  
Industry Establishments (1-year Lead)  -0.00570  
  (-0.255)  
Industry Employment (1-year Lead)  0.000812  
  (0.266)  
Log Employees (2-year Lead)   2.559*** 
   (10.41) 
Industry Establishments (2-year Lead)   0.00595 
   (0.172) 
Industry Employment (2-year Lead)   -0.000469 
   (-0.100) 
Constant 2.427*** 2.070*** 2.281*** 
 (5.083) (3.418) (2.877) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared (with Fixed Effects) 0.970 0.962 0.953 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared within 0.770 0.717 0.591 
R-squared between 0.731 0.728 0.732 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    




4.4.1 Robustness Checks 
We already included alternative specifications with different lead values of the 
dependent variable as part of our main results to help readers compare these effects over 
time. Apart from this, we carried out a number of other robustness checks. Instead of using 
continuous changes in installed base, we defined a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of 0 initially and 1 during the acquisition the time window (2004-2006). Our results 
were robust to the use of this alternative variable in our regressions.  
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Table 4.5 Robustness: H1 with Acquisition Time Window 
  (1) (2) (3) 







       
ATW 0.227** 0.370*** 0.508*** 
 (1.975) (3.077) (2.999) 
Log Employees 2.725***   
 (16.21)   
Industry Establishments -0.00677   
 (-0.440)   
Industry Employment 0.001000   
 (0.481)   
Log Employees (1-year Lead)  2.669***  
  (16.33)  
Industry Establishments (1-year Lead)  -0.0183  
  (-0.822)  
Industry Employment (1-year Lead)  0.00272  
  (0.912)  
Log Employees (2-year Lead)   2.557*** 
   (10.20) 
Industry Establishments (2-year Lead)   0.0144 
   (0.389) 
Industry Employment (2-year Lead)   -0.00171 
   (-0.337) 
Constant 2.888*** 2.932*** 3.603*** 
 (6.868) (6.204) (5.160) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared (with Fixed Effects) 0.969 0.961 0.952 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared within 0.767 0.711 0.584 
R-squared between 0.733 0.731 0.728 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    




Table 4.6 Robustness: H2 with Acquisition Time Window 
  (1) (2) (3) 







       
ATW 0.374** 0.621*** 0.756*** 
 (2.364) (3.610) (3.651) 
ATW X Specialist Firm -0.473 -0.838*** -0.845** 
 (-1.586) (-2.654) (-2.227) 
Log Employees 2.723***   
 (16.21)   
Industry Establishments -0.00725   
 (-0.471)   
Industry Employment 0.00103   
 (0.493)   
Log Employees (1-year Lead)  2.671***  
  (16.80)  












Log Employees (2-year Lead)   2.567*** 
   (10.50) 
Industry Establishments (2-year Lead)   0.00705 
   (0.196) 
Industry Employment (2-year Lead)   -0.000795 
   (-0.161) 
Constant 2.908*** 2.902*** 3.563*** 
 (6.927) (6.257) (5.237) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared (with Fixed Effects) 0.969 0.962 0.953 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared within 0.768 0.715 0.590 
R-squared between 0.735 0.734 0.733 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
ATW (Acquisition Time Window): 2004-2006  
 
Table 4.5 shows the results corresponding to H1 and is comparable to Table 4.3. 
Similarly, Table 4.6 is comparable to Table 4.4 and is in support of H2. 
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We used time dummies in our regressions instead of the controls for industry 
growth. Note that Oracle Market Share varies only with time. Hence, it is not estimable 
separately. However, we are able to test H2 that uses its interaction with Specialist Firm. 
Again, we found our results to be robust to this alternative specification. 
Table 4.7 Robustness: H2 with Time Dummies 











        
Specialist Firm X Oracle Market Share -4.106* -6.175** -5.515* 
 (-1.808) (-2.274) (-1.862) 
2002.y -0.122 -0.0986 -0.110 
 (-0.829) (-0.871) (-0.758) 
2003.y -0.158 -0.106 0.0157 
 (-0.957) (-0.625) (0.0885) 
2004.y 0.0350 0.265 0.310* 
 (0.191) (1.414) (1.680) 
2005.y 0.288 0.468** 0.706*** 
 (1.450) (2.357) (3.660) 
2006.y 0.484** 0.899*** 1.006*** 
 (2.187) (4.014) (4.206) 
Log Employees 2.714***   
 (16.20)   














Constant 3.457*** 3.791*** 4.151*** 
 (7.256) (7.312) (5.218) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared 0.730 0.612 0.540 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared within 0.730 0.612 0.540 
R-squared between 0.710 0.718 0.710 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    





4.5 Alternative Explanations 
4.5.1 Partnership Duration and Steering 
It could be that our results in H2 are driven by the incumbent platform (SAP) 
favoring those partners with longer partnership duration. The fixed effect model that we 
employ controls for the time invariant characteristics of the partnership between the 
complementor and the platform owner. However, this does not account for the time varying 
component of the partnership. The platform partnership involves several repeated 
exchanges and the platform owner would be more willing to trust familiar partners (Gulati, 
1995) with longer partnerships. Also, the duration of the partnership could influence the 
ability of complementors to absorb more knowledge and benefit from steering activities 
such as the SAP Developer Network (SDN) initiated by the platform owner. These in turn 
could end up in better sales for complementor with longer partnerships. We address this 
possibility by including the interaction between the entrant’s market share and the 
partnership duration (as of the year 2004) to our baseline regression. 
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Table 4.8 Alternative Explanation: H2 with the Addition of Partnership Duration 
  (1) (2) (3) 





        
Oracle Market Share 5.033 8.212** 9.658*** 
 (1.640) (2.413) (2.714) 
Specialist Firm X Oracle Market Share -4.101* -6.087** -5.308* 
 (-1.799) (-2.222) (-1.791) 
Oracle Market Share X Partnership Duration -0.200 -0.511 -0.701 
 (-0.352) (-0.800) (-1.193) 
Log Employees 2.710***   
 (16.39)   
Industry Establishments 0.000423   
 (0.0267)   
Industry Employment -0.000522   
 (-0.241)   
Log Employees (1-year Lead)  2.667***  
  (16.60)  
Industry Establishments (1-year Lead)  -0.00767  
  (-0.334)  
Industry Employment (1-year Lead)  0.00111  
  (0.353)  
Log Employees (2-year Lead)   2.547*** 
   (10.34) 
Industry Establishments (2-year Lead)   0.00470 
   (0.137) 
Industry Employment (2-year Lead)   -0.000236 
   (-0.0508) 
Constant 2.399*** 1.972*** 2.161*** 
 (5.029) (3.158) (2.649) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared (with Fixed Effects) 0.950 0.962 0.954 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared within 0.770 0.717 0.593 
R-squared between 0.731 0.727 0.729 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
We find that our results shown in Table 4.8 are robust to the addition of this 
interaction term to the initial specification found in Table 4.4, supporting our original 
theory.  
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4.5.2 Firm Age and Value Appropriation 
While we addressed the possibility that firms could benefit from longer partnerships 
above, it could be that firms simply get better at developing software over time. This in 
turn could influence their productivity and help them achieve higher sales per employee 
over time. This could again provide an alternative explanation for the differential effects 
we observe in H2.  
We address this issue by including the interaction between the entrant’s market 
share and the age of the complementor at the time of forming the partnership with SAP. 
The assumption made is that the firm age measured as at the time of joining the partnership 
should proxy for internal firm learning. The results are shown in Table 4.9 and are 
comparable to the results found in Table 4.4. We find that the interaction effect between 
Age at Partnership and Oracle Market Share is actually negative and significant. However, 
we find that our initial results concerning the differential effects of performance based on 
human capital specialization are still supported. 
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Table 4.9 Alternative Explanation: H2 with the Addition of Firm Age at Partnership 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log Sales 
Log Sales (1-year 
Lead) 
Log Sales (2-year 
Lead) 
        
Oracle Market Share 9.109*** 11.43*** 12.12*** 
 (4.857) (5.795) (5.335) 
Specialist Firm X Oracle Market Share -6.002*** -8.215*** -7.580*** 
 (-2.650) (-3.102) (-2.619) 
 Oracle Market Share X Age at Partnership -6.002*** -8.215*** -7.580*** 
 (-2.650) (-3.102) (-2.619) 
Log Employees 2.673***   
 (16.96)   
Industry Establishments 0.00484   
 (0.303)   
Industry Employment -0.000747   
 (-0.342)   
Log Employees (1-year Lead)  2.633***  
  (17.38)  
Industry Establishments (1-year Lead)  -0.00479  
  (-0.213)  
Industry Employment (1-year Lead)  0.000733  
  (0.239)  
Log Employees (2-year Lead)   2.521*** 
   (10.61) 
Industry Establishments (2-year Lead)   0.00504 
   (0.154) 
Industry Employment (2-year Lead)   -0.000401 
   (-0.0904) 
Constant 2.495*** 2.192*** 2.440*** 
 (5.638) (3.982) (3.356) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
R-squared 0.971 0.964 0.956 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared within 0.784 0.735 0.616 
R-squared between 0.529 0.513 0.517 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
4.5.3 SAP Platform as a Stable Alternative 
 It is quite possible that our results in H1 are driven by the fact that the SAP platform 
was seen as a stable alternative by customers when the industry went through an uncertain 
phase during this consolidation initiated by Oracle’s acquisitions. In particular, given that, 
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once installed, ERP software stays in operation for several years, customers would be 
worried about ongoing support for the software that they install and may like to steer clear 
of uncertainties that may arise due to the merging of several different companies to form 
one common platform. Further, they may also be worried about the continued availability 
of complements on the platform. These uncertainties should result in an increase in SAP 
installed base as well as an increase in SAP complementor sales. Though it is difficult to 
rule out this effect completely, the relative change in the level of installed base of the two 
platforms and Oracle’s ability to successfully catch up with the market leader SAP over 
this time period seems to suggest otherwise. The improvement in sales of SAP 
complementors in spite of the relative increase in Oracle’s market share seems to be driven, 
instead, by SAP’s initiatives aimed at steering the complementors away from the Oracle 
platform. 
4.5.4 Multihoming and Specialization in Human Capital.  
Our results on the performance premium for generalists in H2 could be a function 
of their superior ability to multihome. We do find that the propensity to multihome is far 
greater among generalists than specialists. However, conditional on multihoming, there is 
no significant differential effect on performance between specialists and generalists. We 
confirm this by including the triple interaction involving the Oracle Market Share, 
Specialist Firm, and Multihoming in our regressions (shown in Table 4.10) and checking 
the coefficient on it. We find the triple interaction to be statistically insignificant. While 
these results do not necessarily rule out the possible benefits from multihoming, they do 
not seem to explain the observed difference in performance between generalists and 
specialists.  
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Table 4.10 Oracle Market Share, Specialist Firm, and Multihoming 
  (1) (1) (1) 





        
Oracle Market Share 4.210** 5.887*** 5.772*** 
 (2.591) (3.591) (3.105) 
Specialist Firm X Oracle Market Share -3.633 -5.924* -5.438 
 (-1.373) (-1.853) (-1.600) 
Multihoming 0.823 2.160 1.845** 
 (0.733) (1.608) (2.065) 
 Oracle Market Share X Multihoming -2.020 -4.635 -2.432 
 (-0.663) (-1.473) (-0.887) 
Specialist Firm X Multihoming 0.802 -0.969 1.250 
 (0.513) (-0.561) (0.782) 
Specialist Firm X Oracle Market Share X Multihoming -2.356 1.553 2.570 
 (-0.539) (0.339) (0.535) 
Log Employees 2.707***   
 (16.32)   
Industry Establishments -0.000646   
 (-0.0397)   
Industry Employment -0.000383   
 (-0.170)   
Log Employees (1-year Lead)  2.661***  
  (16.74)  
Industry Establishments (1-year Lead)  -0.00403  
  (-0.180)  
Industry Employment (1-year Lead)  0.000588  
  (0.193)  
Log Employees (2-year Lead)   2.551*** 
   (10.52) 
Industry Establishments (2-year Lead)   0.0188 
   (0.550) 
Industry Employment (2-year Lead)   -0.00221 
   (-0.479) 
Constant 2.291*** 1.922*** 2.252*** 
 (4.457) (2.933) (2.736) 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
Year FE N N N 
Observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 
Number of Firms 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.970 0.962 0.954 
R-squared within 0.770 0.718 0.596 
R-squared between 0.731 0.728 0.719 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we use a sample from the ERP platform ecosystem and focus on the 
effect of platform level competition on complementor performance. Prior research on 
ecosystems that has often relied on network effects based explanations would predict that 
a change in installed base of an entrant relative to the incumbent on one side of the market 
should result in a decrease in performance of complementors associated with the incumbent 
platform. However, this does not take into account the possibility that the incumbent 
platform owner could engage in efforts to substitute efforts of the complementors and be 
more willing to share the value created in the ecosystem. Our results suggests that this is 
indeed a possibility and can lead to a counterintuitive result wherein the performance of 
complementors actually increases when the relative installed base of its partner, the 
incumbent platform owner, decreases. 
Further, we explore whether these main results are affected by the heterogeneity 
among complementors in terms of their human capital. We find that generalists perform 
better than specialists when the relative installed base changes, which we attribute to their 
dynamic and integrative capabilities (Helfat and Raubitschek (2018). We also rule out a 
number of alternative explanations for the results that we observe. In particular, we find 
that these results continue to hold even after accounting for multihoming as a potential 
explanation for differential complementor performance.  
The study has a number of limitations. First, it is based on a single industry setting, making 
it harder to generalize the implications of our findings. Second, we do not have additional 
information on the complementor’s upstream and downstream capabilities. These could 
improve the complementor’s bargaining power as well as affect their response to steering 
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by the platform owner. Third, we do not have additional information on the demand side 
in terms of the nature and expectations of customers. This prevents us from disentangling 
the installed base effects further. We believe that addressing some of these limitations 
could lead to interesting avenues for future research. Even with these limitations, the paper 
makes some notable contributions to the literature. 
Our paper joins a stream of the literature that has questioned the logic of 
interpreting network effects as purely a measure of size (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013; 
Rietveld and Eggers, 2018) and stressed the need to take into account the role of structure 
and conduct within the network (Afuah, 2013). In particular, our work shows that the 
structure of the ecosystem in terms of the human capital within and across complementors 
plays an important role in value creation and appropriation in the context of the ecosystem. 
It also highlights the role of signaling by entrants through acquisitions and the role of trust 
and reputation built by incumbents though steering activities. 
Firm adaptation to change has been an important area of focus in the strategy 
literature. While the bulk of this stream of literature has paid attention to technological 
change, recent work has tried to draw our attention to demand side changes (Agarwal and 
Wu, 2014). Theories based on dynamic capabilities have often been used to explain 
differences in firm adaptation and performance in the face of environmental change. It is 
important to understand how these theories extend to the realm of ecosystems (Teece, 
2010). Our paper is a small step in this direction. In particular we show how integrative 
capabilities of complementors that arise from their human capital can influence adaptation 
to change in complex digital ecosystems (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2018). 
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The paper is also relevant to practitioners. Traditional thinking has been that 
activities such as knowledge sharing and support to complementors are aimed at opening 
up and growing the ecosystem. However, managers in platform owner companies need to 
be aware that these activities can also be used strategically to steer the ecosystem by 
engaging and retaining complementors in the face of competition from rival platforms. The 
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Figure 4.1 Sequence of Events 
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Table 4.11 Installed Base - License Revenues (in $ million) 
Year SAP Oracle 
Oracle Market Share 
Relative to SAP 
2000 681.04 504.68 42.56% 
2001 647.43 413.50 38.98% 
2002 585.36 300.94 33.95% 
2003 608.09 268.32 30.62% 
2004 734.14 302.22 29.16% 
2005 934.85 474.18 33.65% 
2006 1081.02 680.37 38.63% 
2007 1214.66 906.42 42.73% 
2008 1326.26 936.67 41.39% 
2009 909.06 896.24 49.64% 
Note: These values are based on the revenues reported by Oracle and SAP in their annual 






Note: SAP Developer Network (SDN) Beta Site launched back in 2003. It was later renamed as SAP 
Community Network (SCN). 
The graph below captures the level of participation in the network in the form of questions 
raised by members of the ecosystem in response to SAP’s efforts to engage the community. 
 
 


























Figure 4.2 SAP Developer Network Web Announcement 
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Table 4.12 List of Keywords 
Technical 
HC Industry HC Functional HC Managerial HC 
ABAP Aerospace  SAP FICO Management 
Netweaver Defense SAP MM Project Management 
SAP BASIS Automotive SAP SD PMP 
Java Banking SAP PP 
Project Management 
Professional 
Javascript Chemicals SAP BI Manage 
HTML Consumer Products SAP SRM Managed 
SQL Engineering SAP CRM Lead 
Database Construction SAP HCM Led 
Code Operations SAP BW Coordinate 
Coding Healthcare SAP FI Coordinated 
Programmin
g Higher Education SAP PS Control 
Technical Research SAP PM Controlled 
Architectur
e High Tech Financial Accounting Delegate 
C Industrial Machinery  Materials Management Delegated 
C++ Insurance Sales and Distribution Direct 
Websphere Life Sciences Production Planning Directed 
J2EE Media Business Intelligence Supervise 
  Mill Products 
Supplier Relationship 
Management Supervised 
  Mining 
Customer Relationship 
Management   
  Oil  
Human Capital 
Management   
  Gas Business Warehouse   
  Professional Services Project System   
  Public Sector Plant Maintenance   
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  Transportation     
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